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The Double-Edged Sword of Health Care Integration: 
Consolidation and Cost Control* 
ERIN C. FUSE BROWN AND JAIME S. KING† 
The average family of four in the United States spends $25,826 per year on health 
care. American health care costs so much because we both overuse and overpay for 
health care goods and services. The Affordable Care Act’s cost control policies focus 
on curbing overutilization by encouraging health care providers to integrate to pro-
mote efficiency and eliminate waste, but the cost control policies largely ignore 
prices. This article examines this overlooked half of health care cost control policy: 
rising prices and the policy levers held by the states to address them. We challenge 
the conventional wisdom that reducing overutilization through health care integra-
tion will effectively reduce health spending. We argue that vertical integration 
—bringing together disparate providers from hospitals to physicians—is a double-
edged sword, with not only the potential to reduce wasteful and unnecessary use of 
services but also downside risks of increasing market consolidation and health care 
prices. Due to already highly concentrated health care markets and the limits of fed-
eral antitrust enforcement of vertical health care integration, states have both an 
opportunity and an obligation to supplement federal antitrust efforts to control rising 
health care prices stemming from health care integration. The way to manage the 
double-edged sword of health care integration is to require price and quality over-
sight to avoid harm to competition. We offer a menu of six policy initiatives for states 
to choose from, ranging from data collection to rate regulation. If we are to control 
our personal and national health care spending, states have a critical role to play in 
overseeing health care integration and private health care price increases.  
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INTRODUCTION 
It is no secret that U.S. health care costs are out of control. The United States has 
experienced a more than 400% increase in total annual health care expenditures since 
1990,1 exceeding $3 trillion and representing 17.5% of gross domestic product 
(GDP) in 2014 alone.2 The average family of four spends $25,826 on health care per 
year, an amount that could buy the family a new Toyota Prius or Tacoma every year.3 
Yet while we pay more per capita than any other nation for health care, the health of 
American citizens does not reflect this additional spending.  
In the lead-up to the passage of the Affordable Care Act (ACA), Atul Gawande 
laid out what has become the dominant narrative of U.S. health care cost containment 
                                                                                                                 
 
 1. See CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT, 
NATIONAL HEALTH EXPENDITURES, PER CAPITA AMOUNTS, PERCENT DISTRIBUTION, AND 
AVERAGE ANNUAL PERCENT CHANGE: UNITED STATES, SELECTED YEARS 1960–2013, tbl.102 
(2014), http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/hus/2014/102.pdf [https://perma.cc/G4T8-UR67]. 
 2. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., NATIONAL HEALTH EXPENDITURES 2014 
HIGHLIGHTS, https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-and-Reports 
/NationalHealthExpendData/Downloads/highlights.pdf [https://perma.cc/V2NC-X226]. 
 3. CHRIS GIROD, SUE HART & SCOTT WELTZ, 2016 MILLIMAN MEDICAL INDEX 3 (May 
2016), http://us.milliman.com/uploadedFiles/insight/Periodicals/mmi/2016-milliman-medical 
-index.pdf [https://perma.cc/7XYA-S834] (“[O]f the typical family of four’s $25,826 in total 
[health care] spending, . . . the employer pays 57% of costs, or $14,793, while the employee 
pays the other 43%: $6,717 in employee contributions through payroll deduction and $4,316 
in the form of out-of-pocket expenses incurred at time of service.”); see TOYOTA, 
http://www.toyota.com/#!/hybrids-ev [https://perma.cc/8RX2-6D5N] (listing the starting 
price for a 2016 Prius as $19,560) TOYOTA, http://www.toyota.com/#!/trucks 
[https://perma.cc/KL37-YC59] (listing the starting price for a 2017 Tacoma as $24,120).  
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in his highly influential New Yorker article, The Cost Conundrum.4 The narrative was 
this: Medicare health care expenditures vary widely throughout the country in ways 
that cannot be explained by the sickness of the patient population, the quality of care 
provided, or even the cost of producing the health care. The most expensive regions 
in the country have higher health care utilization, and for that extra utilization, they 
produce neither better quality care nor better patient health outcomes. In fact, leading 
researchers estimate that the federal government could eliminate nearly 30% of 
Medicare spending without sacrificing quality or outcomes if higher-spending re-
gions mirrored the utilization patterns of lower-spending regions.5 Following this 
logic, Dr. Gawande and several leading health economists argued that to bend the 
cost curve, the U.S. health care system needed to realign its payment and delivery 
systems to disincentivize and reduce overutilization, and to instead reward coordina-
tion, quality, and efficiency.6 Gawande’s account was so compelling that it became 
required reading in President Obama’s White House and Capitol Hill in the months 
leading up to the passage of the ACA, heavily influencing the translation of cost 
control policies into law.7  
As a result, the cost containment mechanisms of the ACA and other recent health 
care reform efforts focus heavily on reducing overutilization.8 To do so, federal pol-
icy incentivizes vertical integration among providers at different phases of health 
care delivery to improve care coordination, eliminate wasteful or repetitive services, 
encourage shared resources, and reduce overhead expenses.9 Vertical integration in 
health care commonly occurs when a hospital purchases a physician practice, making 
                                                                                                                 
 
 4. Atul Gawande, The Cost Conundrum, NEW YORKER (June 1, 2009), http://www 
.newyorker.com/magazine/2009/06/01/the-cost-conundrum [https://perma.cc/5JHY-4WV4]. 
 5. Id.; see also John E. Wennberg, Elliot S. Fisher & Jonathan S. Skinner, Geography 
and the Debate over Medicare Reform, HEALTH AFF. W96, W104 (Feb. 13, 2002), 
http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/early/2002/02/13/hlthaff.w2.96.short [https://perma.cc 
/V5G6-DW2X].  
 6. See, e.g., Public Meeting of the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission 309,  
380–400 (Nov. 8, 2006), transcript available at http://www.medpac.gov/docs/default 
-source/meeting-materials/november-2006-meeting-transcript.pdf?sfvrsn=0 [https://perma.cc 
/BB5N-G57L] (describing the ACO model variously as “extended hospital medical staff” and 
“accountable organization”); David Cutler, How Health Care Reform Must Bend the Cost 
Curve, 29 HEALTH AFF. 1131 (2010); Elliot S. Fisher, Douglas O. Staiger, Julie P.W. Bynum 
& Daniel J. Gottlieb, Creating Accountable Care Organizations: The Extended Hospital 
Medical Staff, 26 HEALTH AFF. w44 (2007). 
 7. See Bob Kocher & Farzad Mostashari, Opinion, A Health Care Success Story, N.Y. 
TIMES (Sept. 23, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/24/opinion/a-health-care-success 
-story.html [https://perma.cc/4CC4-4PLB]; Robert Pear, Health Care Spending Disparities 
Stir a Fight, N.Y. TIMES (June 8, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/09/us/politics 
/09health.html [https://perma.cc/BF7A-R6L7]. 
 8. Examples include the Medicare Shared Savings Program, 42 U.S.C. § 1395jjj (2012); 
the Hospital Value-Based Purchasing Program, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395ww(o) (West 2015); and 
the National Pilot Program on Payment Bundling, 42 U.S.C. § 1395cc-4 (2012).  
 9. See KAISER FAMILY FOUND., SUMMARY OF THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT (2013), 
http://kff.org/health-reform/fact-sheet/summary-of-the-affordable-care-act [https://perma.cc 
/9UMJ-CUK2].  
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the resulting entity responsible for both inpatient and outpatient care. Unfortunately, 
in this effort to control utilization, we have overlooked the other half of the cost 
control equation: prices.10  
 Health care cost containment efforts must consist of two parts: reducing 
overutilization and constraining health care prices.11 Just like going to the grocery 
store, the amount of your bill depends on how many items you buy as well as the 
price of each item. The United States will not bend the cost curve without addressing 
private health care prices.12 High prices are the main reason the United States spends 
so much more on health care than other wealthy, developed countries.13 Moreover, 
similar to the overutilization problem, the higher prices we pay do not result in more 
or better quality care nor do they lead to better health outcomes.14 While it may be 
true that nearly a third of Medicare spending is waste,15 when looking at our total 
public and private health care spending, price increases explain most of the rise in 
U.S. health care costs,16 eclipsing the effects of increasing utilization, the aging or 
sickness of the population, the supply of health care services, malpractice litigation, 
and defensive medicine.17  
                                                                                                                 
 
 10. See Kevin Quealy & Margot Sanger-Katz, The Experts Were Wrong About the Best 
Places for Better and Cheaper Health Care, N.Y. TIMES: THE UPSHOT (Dec. 15, 2015), http:// 
www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/12/15/upshot/the-best-places-for-better-cheaper-health-care 
-arent-what-experts-thought.html [https://perma.cc/9XNR-CJRB] (quoting Robert Berenson, 
fellow at the Urban Institute, as saying “[p]rice has been ignored in public policy”). 
 11. Erin C. Fuse Brown, The Blind Spot in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act’s Cost-Control Policies, 163 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 871 (2015). 
 12. See Zack Cooper, Stuart Craig, Martin Gaynor & John Van Reenen, The Price Ain’t 
Right? Hospital Prices and Health Spending on the Privately Insured 2–3 (Dec. 2015) 
(unpublished manuscript), http://www.healthcarepricingproject.org/sites/default/files/pricing 
_variation_manuscript_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/3V7T-LL2X].  
 13. Gerard F. Anderson, Uwe E. Reinhardt, Peter S. Hussey & Varduhi Petrosyan, It’s 
the Prices, Stupid: Why the United States Is So Different from Other Countries, 22 HEALTH 
AFF. 89, 103 (2003); Bruce C. Vladeck & Thomas Rice, Market Failure and the Failure of 
Discourse: Facing Up to the Power of Sellers, 28 HEALTH AFF. 1305, 1305–06 (2009). 
 14. See Vladeck & Rice, supra note 13, at 1306. 
 15. See Wennberg et al., supra note 5, at W104. 
 16. Gerard F. Anderson, Peter S. Hussey, Bianca K. Frogner & Hugh R. Waters, Health 
Spending in the United States and the Rest of the Industrialized World, 24 HEALTH AFF. 903, 
904 (2005); Hamilton Moses III, David H. M. Matheson, E. Ray Dorsey, Benjamin P. George, 
David Sadoff & Satoshi Yoshimura, The Anatomy of Health Care in the United States, 310 
JAMA 1947, 1949 (2013). 
 17.  Anderson et al., supra note 16, at 904; Moses III et al., supra note 16, at 1949 (“Be-
tween 2000 and 2011, increase in price (particularly of drugs, medical devices, and hospital 
care), not intensity of service or demographic change, produced most of the increase in health’s 
share of GDP.”); OFFICE OF ATT’Y GEN. MARTHA COAKLEY, EXAMINATION OF HEALTH CARE 
COST TRENDS AND COST DRIVERS 3–4, 16–27, 35 (2010), http://www.mass.gov/ago/docs 
/healthcare/2010-hcctd-full.pdf [https://perma.cc/928G-3242] (“Price increases, not increases 
in utilization, caused most of the increases in health care costs during the past few years in 
Massachusetts.”). 
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In the United States, the health care pricing problem is largely a provider market 
power problem.18 Within the same geographic area, there can be a 60% difference 
between the highest- and lowest-priced hospitals for the same inpatient service, and 
a twofold difference in prices for outpatient services.19 A substantial body of research 
demonstrates that market power drives these unwarranted variations in price between 
providers, not differences in quality, payer mix, demographics, or health of the pa-
tient population.20 In other words, when we pay more at a high-price provider, we 
rarely receive more or better care; we simply pay more for its market leverage.21  
Unfortunately, the vertical integration used to target overutilization may also in-
crease provider market leverage.22 The primary vehicle for achieving vertical inte-
gration in the ACA is the Accountable Care Organization (ACO), a group of affili-
ated doctors, hospitals, and other health care providers that cooperate to provide 
high-quality, coordinated care to a specific patient population.23 To form an ACO, 
provider organizations can integrate clinically, structurally, and/or financially. How-
ever, obtaining the desired clinical and financial integration can also open the door 
for health care provider organizations to vertically integrate in ways that further con-
solidate health care markets, increase provider market leverage, and raise prices. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 18. See, e.g., PAUL B. GINSBURG, CTR. FOR STUDYING HEALTH SYS. CHANGE, RESEARCH 
BRIEF NO. 16, WIDE VARIATION IN HOSPITAL AND PHYSICIAN PAYMENT RATES EVIDENCE OF 
PROVIDER MARKET POWER 6 (2010), http://www.hschange.org/CONTENT/1162/1162.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/U2XN-HGAH]; CHAPIN WHITE, AMELIA M. BOND & JAMES D. 
RESCHOVSKY, CTR. FOR STUDYING HEALTH SYS. CHANGE, RESEARCH BRIEF NO. 27, HIGH AND 
VARYING PRICES FOR PRIVATELY INSURED PATIENTS UNDERSCORE HOSPITAL MARKET POWER 
2 (2013), http://www.hschange.com/CONTENT/1375/1375.pdf [https://perma.cc/987U-AVYX]; 
Robert A. Berenson, Paul G. Ginsburg, Jon B. Christianson & Tracy Yee, The Growing Power 
of Some Providers To Win Steep Payment Increases from Insurers Suggests Policy Remedies 
May Be Needed, 31 HEALTH AFF. 973, 973 (2012); Robert Berenson, Acknowledging the 
Elephant: Moving Market Power and Prices to the Center of Health Policy, HEALTH AFF. 
BLOG (June 3, 2014), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2014/06/03/acknowledging-the-elephant-moving 
-market-power-and-prices-to-the-center-of-health-policy/ [https://perma.cc/CC5X-4M9R]. 
 19. WHITE ET AL., supra note 18, at 2–4. 
 20. OFFICE OF ATT’Y GEN. MARTHA COAKLEY, supra note 17, at 2–4; Joseph P. Newhouse 
& Alan M. Garber, Geographic Variation in Health Care Spending in the United States: 
Insights from an Institute of Medicine Report, 310 JAMA 1227, 1227–28 (2013) (“[P]rice var-
iation is responsible for an estimated 70% of the total geographic variation in spending among 
privately insured persons. Variation in wage levels and variation in the quantity of services 
delivered are almost equally responsible for the remaining estimated 30% of spending varia-
tion.”); Cooper et al., supra note 12, at 3 (concluding that hospital market structure, that is, the 
degree of competition in the market, is strongly associated with hospital prices); GINSBURG, 
supra note 18, at 7.  
 21. OFFICE OF ATT’Y GEN. MARTHA COAKLEY, supra note 17, at 3–4; see GINSBURG, 
supra note 18, at 6.  
 22. Katherine Baicker & Helen Levy, Coordination Versus Competition in Health Care 
Reform, 369 NEW ENG. J. MED. 789, 789–91 (2013). 
 23. Accountable Care Organizations (ACO), CTRS. MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS. (Jan. 
6, 2015, 2:58 PM), https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Medicare-Fee-for-Service-Payment/ACO 
/index.html?redirect=/ACO/ [https://perma.cc/2JH4-FX2D].  
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Despite all the hoped-for benefits from health care integration, there is no empirical 
evidence showing that the wave of integration is generating efficiencies or wide-
spread savings. On the contrary, all the emerging literature on vertical integration 
between hospitals and physicians points in the same troubling direction: vertical in-
tegration is associated with increased prices and reduced consumer welfare.24 
This article examines the overlooked half of the narrative on health care cost 
control: rising prices and the policy levers held by the states to address them. 
Specifically, we challenge the conventional wisdom that policies directed at health 
care integration and utilization controls alone can meaningfully reduce health 
spending, and we consider the potentially harmful effects from increasing vertical 
integration between hospitals and provider organizations.25 We argue that un-
regulated vertical integration is a double-edged sword that poses significant risks to 
consumer welfare from increased health care prices. Due to already highly 
concentrated health care markets and the limits of federal antitrust enforcement of 
vertical health care integration, states have both an opportunity and an obligation to 
supplement federal antitrust efforts to control rising health care prices stemming 
from health care integration.  
The way to address the double-edged sword of vertical health care integration is 
to allow beneficial integration with a quid pro quo that the integrating entities must 
submit to oversight regarding price, quality, and competition. We offer six policy 
initiatives available to states in order of least to greatest amount of intervention into 
the state’s health care market: all-payer claims databases (APCDs); state antitrust 
enforcement or immunity; ACO certification programs; rate oversight authority; pro-
vider price caps; and rate regulation.26 
 Given the range of initiatives, legislators should vary their policy prescription 
based upon the particular market and political dynamics in the state. Three key in-
gredients, however, emerge as critical for effective state oversight of vertical inte-
gration and private price increases: (1) Information—states must have a means to 
collect and analyze price, quality, utilization, and market data, such as an all-payer 
claims database, in order to match their policy approach to their market and to eval-
uate their success; (2) Independence—state oversight bodies must be insulated from 
                                                                                                                 
 
 24. A discussion of this literature is set forth infra Part II. 
 25. In this article, we focus specifically on vertical integration because antitrust authori-
ties have generally treated its use as procompetitive. As a result of this treatment, antitrust 
analysis and guidance for vertical integration efforts are much less robust than for horizontal 
consolidation among direct substitutes or competitors, such as mergers among hospitals.  
 26. States may also increase health care competition by implementing policies to elimi-
nate certificate-of-need laws that pose barriers to entry for new health facilities, loosening of 
scope-of-practice laws to allow different types of mid-level providers to compete with or aug-
ment the supply of physician services, or regulating provider-plan contracting practices to re-
strict anticompetitive use of most-favored-nation or anti-tiering clauses. We do not discuss 
these policies here because they mostly address threats to horizontal competition rather than 
describing ways states can oversee vertically integrated entities. For a good discussion of these 
options, see NAT’L ACAD. SOC. INS., ADDRESSING PRICING POWER IN HEALTH CARE MARKETS: 
PRINCIPLES AND POLICY OPTIONS TO STRENGTHEN AND SHAPE MARKETS 29–37 (2015) 
[hereinafter NASI PANEL ON PRICING POWER], https://www.nasi.org/sites/default/files/research 
/Addressing_Pricing_Power_in_Health_Care_Markets.pdf [https://perma.cc/7ASE-W8YG]. 
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the powerful providers they oversee; and (3) Regulatory Authority—state oversight 
bodies must have the authority to enforce or impose limits on providers’ prices when 
they become too high.  
This Article explores the states’ critical role in addressing the double-edged sword 
of health care integration. Part I documents the rise of vertical health care integration 
driven by its theoretical benefits, as well as the legal incentives to integrate. Part II 
describes the emerging evidence that vertical integration in health care may also pose 
a threat to competition and lead to increased prices. Part III explains that states have 
a key role to play in managing this threat because of the limits of federal antitrust 
enforcement, federal oversight, and market-based solutions. Part IV posits that the 
way to manage the double-edged sword of vertical health care integration is to permit 
beneficial integration to proceed in exchange for price and quality oversight by states. 
Part IV goes on to examine an array of policy tools that all build upon robust all-
payer claims data gathering to inform future health policy decisions.  
I. THE RISE OF HEALTH CARE INTEGRATION 
Health care in the United States is notoriously fragmented and inefficient.27 A 
popular policy view posits that increased vertical integration and collaboration in 
health care can reduce waste, increase efficiency, and improve quality by altering the 
financial incentives to overuse care and permitting physicians and other providers to 
more easily coordinate care.28 Accordingly, recent health care reforms have created 
powerful incentives for providers and even health plans to form vertically integrated 
systems, whether to operate an ACO or better manage the shift away from fee-for-
service to new payment models based on value.29 But little is known about what 
conditions are required for health care integration to achieve these efficiencies or 
whether the benefits of integration outweigh the risks to competition and concentra-
tion of market power. Part I explores the theoretical promise of vertical health care 
integration and the incentives for integration contained in various legal reforms, in-
cluding the ACA. 
A. Theoretical Benefits of Vertical Integration 
Unlike horizontal consolidation,30 vertical integration is theoretically ambigu-
ous—it may achieve increased efficiencies, but it may also serve to enhance market 
                                                                                                                 
 
 27. See, e.g., THE FRAGMENTATION OF U.S. HEALTH CARE: CAUSES AND SOLUTIONS (Einer 
Elhauge ed., 2010). 
 28. See Cutler, supra note 6, at 1133–34.  
 29. Similar incentives exist for horizontal consolidations between hospitals or between 
health insurers. Indeed, the pace of horizontal mergers in health care has also increased fol-
lowing the passage of the ACA. See Leemore Dafny, Hospital Industry Consolidation—Still 
More To Come?, 370 NEW ENG. J. MED. 198, 198 (2014).  
 30. The literature on the anticompetitive potential of horizontal consolidation among hos-
pitals is clearer than for vertical integration. See, e.g., MARTIN GAYNOR & ROBERT TOWN, 
ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUND., THE IMPACT OF HOSPITAL CONSOLIDATION—UPDATE 
(2012), http://www.rwjf.org/content/dam/farm/reports/issue_briefs/2012/rwjf73261 [https:// 
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power.31 In microeconomics, vertical integration refers to the common ownership of 
two different stages of production of a product, such as manufacturing and distribu-
tion.32 In health care, vertical integration refers to the integration of suppliers of dif-
ferent components of health care services, such as hospitals and physicians, as well 
as integration of health systems and health plans, which collectively supply different 
elements of the health care product to the ultimate consumer.33 
According to neoclassical economic models, vertical integration enhances effi-
ciency by reducing transaction costs and arm’s-length contracting across separate 
organizations.34 In health care, vertical integration has similarly been thought to im-
prove efficiency through improved care coordination and reduction of fragmentation 
among providers and payers.35 Common ownership of hospitals and physician inputs 
in the health care “supply chain” can align financial incentives between hospitals and 
referring physicians, reduce duplicative or unnecessary care, provide centralized ad-
ministrative services, and reduce transaction costs by allowing joint contracting with 
third-party payers.36 Vertical mergers of hospitals and physicians or health plans into 
integrated delivery systems may reduce the costs of complex negotiations between 
providers and payers. Between hospitals and physicians, arm’s-length contracts are 
costly to establish, whether due to health care fraud and abuse laws that limit 
hospital-physician contracts or payment systems that separate hospital and physician 
payments.37 As a result, vertical integration in health care has the potential to create 
significant efficiencies.  
                                                                                                                 
 
perma.cc/JK6R-397T]. Our analysis, therefore, focuses on the “harder case” of vertical health 
care integration. See Thomas L. Greaney, Competition Policy After Health Care Reform: 
Mending Holes in Antitrust Law’s Protective Net, 40 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 897, 897–98 
(2015). 
 31. Martin Gaynor & Robert J. Town, Competition in Health Care Markets, in 2 
HANDBOOK OF HEALTH ECONOMICS 499, 620 (Mark V. Pauly, Thomas G. McGuire & Pedro 
Pita Barros eds., 2012). 
 32. See Austin B. Frakt, Steven D. Pizer & Roger Feldman, Plan-Provider Integration, 
Premiums, and Quality in the Medicare Advantage Market, 48 HEALTH SERVS. RES. 1996, 
1999 (2013). 
 33. Christopher Afendulis & Daniel Kessler, Vertical Integration and Optimal 
Reimbursement Policy 5 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 17316, 2011). 
 34. Laurence C. Baker, M. Kate Bundorf & Daniel P. Kessler, Vertical Integration: 
Hospital Ownership of Physician Practices Is Associated with Higher Prices and Spending, 
33 HEALTH AFFAIRS 756, 756–57 (2014); Gaynor & Town, supra note 31, at 619–20. 
 35. See, e.g., Baker et al., supra note 34, at 756–57; Lawton Robert Burns, Jeff C. 
Goldsmith & Aditi Sen, Horizontal and Vertical Integration of Physicians: A Tale of Two 
Tails, 15 ADVANCES HEALTH CARE MGMT. 39, 66–70 (2013); Stephen L. Walston, John R. 
Kimberly & Lawton R. Burns, Owned Vertical Integration and Health Care: Promise and 
Performance, 21 HEALTH CARE MGMT. REV. 83, 84–85 (1996). 
 36. Afendulis & Kessler, supra note 33, at 5.  
 37. Baker et al., supra note 34, at 757; William M. Sage, Getting the Product Right: How 
Competition Policy Can Improve Health Care Markets, 33 HEALTH AFF. 1076, 1078 (2014).  
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B. Policy Incentives for Vertical Integration 
Based on these economic assumptions and the utilization-centered narrative of 
health care cost containment,38 the ACA offers numerous incentives to promote ver-
tical integration in health care. The primary example is the Medicare Shared Savings 
Program, which encourages providers to form ACOs for Medicare beneficiaries, with 
the intent that private payers would adopt the model as well.39 ACOs are groups of 
providers organized into a formal legal entity that agrees to be collectively account-
able for the cost and quality of the health care for a defined population of individu-
als.40 The ACO structure rewards groups of providers for improving quality and care 
coordination while reducing unnecessary utilization by paying them a share of the 
amount they save for the payer.41 To the extent that an ACO assumes insurance risk, 
the providers within the ACO have an incentive to reduce the overall volume of ser-
vices and reduce waste.42 Shared savings payments for ACOs further encourage hos-
pitals and physicians to integrate to increase efficiency and reduce costs. Vertically 
integrated entities can more easily share data, eliminate redundancy, invest in 
interoperable health information technology, and implement clinical protocols that 
cross care settings. Further, vertical integration can make it easier to reduce “internal 
agency problems and take advantage of economies of scope.”43 
Other Medicare programs, such as bundled payments or value-based purchasing, 
also create incentives for fragmented providers to work together, coordinate care, 
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and collectively internalize the costs of disparate aspects of an entire care episode. 
The payment bundling program pays providers a single lump-sum payment to cover 
all inpatient, physician, outpatient, and post-acute services involved in the episode 
of care.44 The ACA also implements significant payment cuts to hospitals according 
to measures of quality and value. These payment changes include Medicare rate cuts 
for excessive readmissions45 and hospital-acquired conditions,46 and calculating 
Medicare bonuses or penalties based on measures of value.47 The upshot of all these 
Medicare payment reforms for providers is that they are assuming more financial risk 
and experiencing major changes to their business and revenue models, built on the 
old fee-for-service and diagnosis-based reimbursement methods.  
Providers may look to consolidation to maximize their ability to assume financial 
risk. Bigger systems have more enrollees, and ACOs need to be sufficiently large to 
be able to absorb financial risk and make the financial investments needed to achieve 
economies of scope necessary to generate cost savings on which ACO payments de-
pend.48 Furthermore, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and Department of 
Justice (DOJ) have largely focused their antitrust policy guidance and review on 
horizontal provider consolidation, further encouraging providers to integrate 
vertically.49 
In 2015, Congress passed the Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act 
(MACRA), which, among other things, repealed the formula that ties Medicare phy-
sician payments to a “sustainable growth rate” (SGR).50 MACRA adds to the mo-
mentum of provider consolidation by shifting more physicians to value-based and 
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alternative payment models. Also known as the “doc fix,” MACRA replaced the 
widely unpopular SGR-based formula with a plan to implement Medicare physician 
fee bonuses based on participation in alternative payment models, such as ACOs.51 
For physicians who do not participate in alternative payment models, MACRA ad-
justs their fee-for-service rates according to a merit-based incentive program that 
takes into account the physician’s quality measures, resource use, and adoption of 
electronic health records.52  
On top of the incentives already in the ACA, MACRA pushes more physicians to 
join ACOs. Even for physicians who stick with fee-for-service, the incentive-based 
adjustments to their fees nudge physicians toward integration with larger systems 
due to the administrative burden and expense of implementing quality reporting, 
electronic health records, and resource use analysis. Together, the payment reforms 
of the ACA and MACRA are driving an upsurge of vertical health care integration. 
The ACA’s incentives extend beyond payment changes. The regulatory environ-
ment also favors clinical and financial integration among hospitals, physicians, and 
other types of providers (such as post-acute providers) by providing valuable waivers 
for onerous regulatory regimes like the Stark Law, Anti-Kickback Statute, and lim-
ited antitrust scrutiny to providers who implement a Medicare ACO or bundled pay-
ment pilot program.53 Provider liability under the Stark Law, compounded with the 
False Claims Act’s treble damages, create an environment of extreme financial risk 
for hospitals, physicians, and other providers who seek to more closely align finan-
cial incentives and clinical processes. The greatest regulatory flexibility comes with 
forming a Medicare-approved ACO because then the ACO participants, and the pay-
ments made between them, are largely exempted from having to comply with the 
Stark Law and the Anti-Kickback Statute.54  
In addition, the antitrust review process for ACOs only applies to independent 
entities collaborating to form an ACO, which may also create an incentive for verti-
cally situated health care entities to merge into a unified delivery system prior to 
applying to participate in the Medicare Shared Savings Program, to ease the approval 
process. While the prior merger would be subject to FTC oversight and review, the 
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FTC has challenged very few vertical mergers, and none among health care entities.55 
Thus, if a hospital or physician group is contemplating forming a relationship to co-
ordinate care, share referrals, and assume responsibility for the health and spending 
of a population of patients, there are strong regulatory incentives to merge or form a 
fully integrated ACO rather than adopting looser, contractual forms of alignment. 
These regulatory incentives are further enhanced by increases in market power and 
leverage that could arise from a merger or integration.  
Many of the desired benefits of clinical and financial integration, however, do not 
require health care entities to merge or formally integrate. Vertical integration can 
occur on several levels. The loosest form of vertical integration, the open contract 
form, would be a nonexclusive contractual relationship between a hospital and a 
group of physicians, such as the hospital’s medical staff or an independent practice 
association (IPA), in which the hospital provides some administrative support for 
health plan contracting and may engage in nominal care-coordination activities.56 An 
intermediate form of vertical integration, the closed contract form, would involve an 
exclusive contractual relationship between the hospital and a select group of physi-
cians, in which the hospital provides higher levels of administrative and management 
services (e.g., electronic health records, billing, utilization and quality review, etc.), 
private health plan contracting, and care coordination.57 The tightest form of vertical 
integration is when the hospital owns the physician practices or directly employs the 
physicians.58 ACOs themselves can be organized along a spectrum from loose to 
tight integration between hospitals and physician-participants. While entities in these 
looser models can still engage in significant clinical and financial integration (such 
as shared electronic medical records systems, payment incentives, and quality-of-
care reporting mechanisms), tighter forms of integration may be encouraged by fi-
nancial and regulatory incentives. 
Because of the promise of accountable care and the payment incentives through 
reform efforts, the pace of all types of vertical health care integration has increased. 
From 2004 to 2011, hospital ownership of physician practices, the tightest form of 
hospital-physician integration, increased from 24% to 49%.59 The Government 
Accountability Office reports that the number of vertically integrated physicians 
nearly doubled from 95,000 to 182,000 between 2007 and 2013.60 Although not all 
ACOs necessarily involve vertical integration of hospitals and physicians, most do.61 
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Following the passage of the ACA, the growth of ACOs has been rapid, with more 
than 700 ACOs established nationwide by 2015, about evenly split between 
Medicare and commercial ACOs.62 ACOs cover approximately 23.5 million individ-
uals, and only about a third of this total (7.8 million) are Medicare enrollees.63 It is 
projected that a majority of Americans will receive their care from an ACO by 2018.64 
Some of the same trends driving health care provider integration are also contrib-
uting to an increase in plan-provider integrations. New payment models, like global 
payments, require provider organizations to assume more financial risk, which en-
tails being responsible for the cost of care for an entire population of patients. Up to 
a point, the larger an organization is, the better it is able to assume population risk 
and invest in systems to meet quality targets. However, as it does, the provider net-
work must assume more of the functions and capacity of health insurers. An ACO or 
a health system that is part of an ACO will be more likely to meet quality and cost- 
savings goals if it has the capacity to manage clinical, quality, and cost data and to 
take on financial risk, and one of the easiest ways for providers to acquire this capac-
ity is to merge with a health plan.65 
From the payers’ perspective, health insurers are increasingly regulated under the 
ACA even while insurance market dynamics are changing. Many plans are either 
shifting more of the insurance/financial risk to providers (through ACOs and alter-
native payment systems) or leaving insurance risk with self-insured employers. 
Health plans are marketing their capacities for financial risk management, data gath-
ering and analysis, and care management to providers via management services con-
tracts or consolidation into common entities.66 The ACA’s requirements, including 
medical-loss ratios,67 limits on underwriting activities,68 guaranteed issue,69 and the 
Cadillac Tax on costly employer-sponsored health plans70 are altering the business 
models of health plans and putting limits on the amount of profits the plans can earn 
from their premium revenue. As a result, health plans are looking for ways to increase 
their market share and shift their function to more of an administrative role, such as 
processing claims and gathering data on quality and cost. These trends are pushing 
more health plans to consider combinations with providers.  
Consequently, vertical integration between providers and health plans is rising. In 
one report from 2012, approximately 20% of hospital networks offered an integrated 
                                                                                                                 
 
 62. Shortell et al., supra note 48, at 646. 
 63. David Muhlestein, Growth and Dispersion of Accountable Care Organizations in 
2015, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Mar. 31, 2015), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2015/03/31/growth-and 
-dispersion-of-accountable-care-organizations-in-2015-2/ [https://perma.cc/45TD-A42D].  
 64. Id. 
 65. See Frakt et al., supra note 32, at 1997.  
 66. Victor R. Fuchs & Leonard D. Schaeffer, If Accountable Care Organizations Are the 
Answer, Who Should Create Them?, 307 JAMA 2261, 2262 (2012).  
 67. 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-27 (2010). 
 68. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-3 (2011). 
 69. 26 U.S.C. § 35 (2012). 
 70. 26 U.S.C. § 4980I (2010). 
68 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL  [Vol. 92:55 
 
insurance plan, with another 20% contemplating doing so.71 Within the Medicare 
Advantage market, in which Medicare beneficiaries receive Medicare services 
through private managed care plans, about 17% of Medicare Advantage plans were 
integrated with providers in 2013.72 A 2015 poll of fifty-eight chief executive officers 
of health care providers and plans found that 88% predicted more plan-provider col-
laboration in the next three to five years.73 For instance, several hospital systems in 
California, other than Kaiser Permanente,74 have begun offering insurance through 
Covered California (California’s health care marketplace under the ACA).75  
Whether between hospitals and physicians or plans and providers, vertical inte-
gration in health care is on the rise. Providers are rapidly consolidating before we 
have a clear sense of what effect this integration will have on health care markets and 
prices. The early evidence is ominous. 
II. THE DOUBLE-EDGED SWORD OF VERTICAL HEALTH CARE INTEGRATION 
Despite its many anticipated benefits, vertical health care integration presents a 
double-edged sword. The effort to promote beneficial integration has opened the 
door to health care consolidation across the country. Emerging empirical data reveals 
that vertical integration carries significant downside risks to competition and con-
sumer welfare through increases in market power, increases in referrals and reim-
bursement rates, and reductions in consumer choice. Moreover, these studies have 
not found any evidence supporting the assumptions that vertical health care integra-
tion generates efficiencies or reduces costs.  
A. Increased Market Power 
Theoretical models suggest that vertical integration between hospitals and physi-
cians can harm competition by conferring greater market power on the merged entity. 
First, if at least one of the parties (either the hospital or physician group) has market 
power pre-merger, then a merger of the two can increase the aggregate market power 
of the merged entity vis-à-vis health plans.76 In 1999, Ester Gal-Or argued that the 
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profitability of vertical hospital-physician mergers depended on the relative competi-
tiveness between the hospital and physician markets.77 She reasoned that when the 
merging hospital and physician markets share similar levels of competitiveness, the 
merged entity can negotiate higher rates due to increased market power.78 The market 
power increase is strongest when both merging entities are in highly concentrated 
markets. By contrast, when the relative level of competitiveness differs significantly 
between the two markets, vertical mergers between physicians and hospitals may be 
unprofitable unless the merger includes a vertical restraint requiring exclusivity be-
tween the parties.79  
One way vertical integration increases the market share of the merged entity is 
through tying hospital and physician services together. Hospitals that acquire physi-
cian groups can effectively lock up the referral pool of physicians and bundle hospital 
and physician services together when negotiating with payers.80 This type of tying 
increases bargaining power of the merged provider-entity because in order for an 
insurer to include one provider in its network, it must also include other tied provid-
ers or services, often at elevated rates.81 In highly concentrated health-care and 
health-insurance markets with significant barriers to entry, tying and refusal to sup-
ply can lead to rival exclusion.82 In its most extreme form, a vertically integrated 
entity will require “all or nothing” dealing, in which an insurer must either include 
all affiliated providers in its network or none at all.83 One way of achieving an “all 
or nothing” bargaining position is to enter into exclusive agreements between hospi-
tals and physician groups, where the parties are unable to bargain with health plans 
outside of the tied entity.84 “All or nothing” dealing can lead to supracompetitive 
reimbursement rates across a wide range of providers in a particular provider 
organization. 
Another way vertical mergers can increase the merged entities’ market power is 
through foreclosure.85 Foreclosure occurs when “actual and potential competitors are 
disadvantaged due to restricted access to one of the most favorable providers,” 
                                                                                                                 
 
Anticompetitive? Definitely Maybe (but That’s Not Final), 25 J. HEALTH ECON. 175, 180–81 
(2006); Afendulis & Kessler, supra note 33, at 5. 
 77. Gal-Or, supra note 76, at 625.  
 78. Id. at 624. This was true even in the absence of exclusivity requirements.  
 79. Id. at 625. 
 80. Baker et al., supra note 34, at 757. 
 81. BARAK D. RICHMAN, AM. ENTER. INST., CONCENTRATION IN HEALTH CARE MARKETS: 
CHRONIC PROBLEMS AND BETTER SOLUTIONS 13 (Thomas P. Miller ed., 2012), http://www 
.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/-concentration-in-health-care-markets-chronic-problems 
-and-better-solutions_171350288300.pdf [https://perma.cc/NWJ4-XQBD]. 
 82. Robert F. Leibenluft, Antitrust and Provider Collaborations: Where We’ve Been and 
What Should Be Done Now, 40 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 847, 850 (2015). 
 83. NASI PANEL ON PRICING POWER, supra note 26, at 17 (describing “all-or-none” bar-
gaining by large, multihospital systems).  
 84. See Gal-Or, supra note 76, at 625.  
 85. Thomas L. Greaney & Douglas Ross, Navigating Through the Fog of Vertical Merger 
Law: A Guide to Counselling Hospital-Physician Consolidation Under the Clayton Act, 91 
WASH. L. REV. 199 (2016).  
70 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL  [Vol. 92:55 
 
making their costs higher for equivalent services and quality.86 The merger of a 
hospital with a physician group can foreclose rival hospitals from accessing the 
services of the integrated physicians, thereby increasing market power.87 In 
particular, competitors may lose patient volume needed to support their facilities 
because they cannot access the integrated physicians’ referrals.88  
Empirical evidence supporting theoretical hypotheses that vertical health care 
mergers can be used to increase market power and prices has begun to emerge.89 In 
an earlier study, Alison Evans Cuellar and Paul Gertler similarly found that tighter 
forms of hospital-physician integration in the 1990s showed significantly higher 
prices and volume than stand-alone, unintegrated providers, supporting the theory 
that such vertical integrations are done to increase market power.90 But Federico 
Ciliberto and David Dranove found that vertical integration during the 1990s did not 
affect hospital prices.91 The opposite results in these two contemporaneous studies 
were seen as consistent with the theory that vertical integration can be both 
efficiency-enhancing and anticompetitive.92 There are differences between the mar-
ket conditions of the 1990s and today; one significant difference is that the hospital 
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market is substantially more concentrated today, which may amplify the anti-
competitive effects of vertical integration between hospitals and physicians.93  
Indeed, more recent studies are starting to show that current forms of vertical in-
tegration can lead to higher prices. Laurence Baker, M. Kate Bundorf, and David 
Kessler examined vertical integration between 2001 and 2007 and found that the 
tightest form of vertical integration—hospital ownership of physician practices 
—was associated with higher hospital prices, increased spending, and only modestly 
reduced utilization in the form of hospital admissions.94 To evaluate integration’s 
effects on physician prices, Cory Capps, David Dranove, and Christopher Ody 
looked at vertical mergers between 2007 and 2013 and found that physician prices 
increased nearly 14% following integration with hospitals.95 The price increase was 
not due to an increase in physician market power through horizontal mergers between 
physicians. Rather, the price increase corresponded to the hospital’s market share 
prior to integration—the larger the market share, the greater the price increase 
—which could be due to the hospital’s ability to charge facility fees for services 
previously provided on an outpatient basis or patients’ willingness to pay a premium 
for a plan with both a desired hospital and a preferred physician group.96  
James Robinson and Kelly Miller examined vertically integrated organizations in 
California between 2009 and 2012 and found that hospital ownership of physician 
organizations led to significantly higher total expenditures per patient compared to 
physician-owned organizations.97 The expenditures were 10.3% higher for physician 
organizations owned by a local hospital, and 19.8% higher when the physician or-
ganization was owned by a multihospital system.98 The larger the market share of the 
vertically integrated hospital owner, the greater the expenditures. Notably, the study 
showed little or no evidence that vertical consolidation of hospitals and physicians 
resulted in increased efficiency.99 
Another study by Hannah Neprash, Michael Chernew, Andrew Hicks, Teresa 
Gibson, and Michael McWilliams found that markets with greater increases in 
hospital-physician integration between 2008 and 2012 experienced significantly 
greater increases in outpatient spending and prices.100 Because commercial price dif-
ferences were greater than differences in Medicare prices, the authors concluded that 
the price increases associated with the hospital-physician integration resulted from 
enhanced market power of integrated providers, not just the site-of-service 
                                                                                                                 
 
 93. See James C. Robinson & Kelly Miller, Total Expenditures per Patient in Hospital-
Owned and Physician-Owned Physician Organizations in California, 312 JAMA 1663 (2014). 
 94. Baker et al., supra note 34, at 760.  
 95. Capps et al., supra note 89, at 3.  
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differential allowing higher prices for integrated physicians, discussed below.101 Like 
Robinson and Miller’s, the study by Neprash et al. found that hospital-physician in-
tegration was not associated with reduced utilization or improved efficiency from 
care coordination.102 
Empirical data on the effect of vertical integration between health plans and pro-
viders is even more limited than hospital-physician integration. In 2013, Austin 
Frakt, Steven Pizer, and Roger Feldman examined the impact of plan-provider inte-
gration on health care premiums and quality in the Medicare Advantage market.103 
The study revealed that plan-provider integration was associated with higher monthly 
premiums and also higher quality ratings than nonintegrated plans.104 However, only 
30% of the premium increase associated with integration was attributable to im-
provements in quality.105 Although some of the increased premiums could have been 
due to benefit enhancements, the authors did not observe a statistically significant 
increase in benefit generosity following integration for several benefits examined.106 
The authors hypothesized that the increase in premiums also could have resulted 
from an increase in market power conferred on the plan from the integrated provider 
organization.107 While the Frakt et al. study has several limitations related to its 
generalizability and conclusions,108 it raises significant concerns regarding the ability 
of plans and providers to use vertical integration as a means to increase market power 
and leverage, warranting significantly more attention from health services research-
ers and antitrust enforcers.  
Overall, the emerging research on vertical integration has found that hospital own-
ership of physician organizations correlates with higher hospital prices, physician 
prices, prices for outpatient procedures, and per-patient expenditures. Furthermore, 
the only study on plan-provider integration also found an association between inte-
gration and higher premiums. These studies, and the dearth of any findings illustrat-
ing significant efficiencies or cost savings, lend support to the view that vertical in-
tegration in health care can be used to increase market power and prices. 
B. Increases in Referrals and Reimbursement 
Another anticompetitive effect of vertical integration is that acquisition of physi-
cian groups by hospitals may increase health spending from greater utilization and 
patient volume by allowing the hospital to pay for referrals within the bounds of 
health care self-referral laws.109 The federal Anti-Kickback Statute and the Stark Law 
both provide greater flexibility for hospitals to compensate employed, as opposed to 
                                                                                                                 
 
 101. Id. For discussion of the site-of-service differential, see infra Part II.B.  
 102. Neprash et al., supra note 100, at 1938.  
 103. See Frakt et al., supra note 32, at 1996. 
 104. Id. at 2008.  
 105. Id. at 2008–09.  
 106. Id. at 2009.  
 107. Id.  
 108. Id. at 2009–10.  
 109. Afendulis & Kessler, supra note 33, at 6–7; Capps et al., supra note 89, at 1.  
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contracted, physicians. For example, hospitals can pay employed physicians produc-
tivity bonuses for services personally performed by the physician, which would not 
be permitted for nonemployed physicians (i.e., independent contractors).110 Hospitals 
also can more readily require their employed physicians to refer patients to the hos-
pital or to other integrated providers than they can require of independent physi-
cians.111 Moreover, when the integrated entities share fixed assets, it is easier for 
them to financially benefit from referrals within the integrated entity within the stric-
tures of anti-referral and anti-kickback laws.112 Hospitals, for example, are willing to 
acquire primary care physicians even if it is a money-losing proposition for the hos-
pital because it allows the hospital to capture (and thus pay for) the primary-care 
physicians’ referrals for hospital services.113 When explaining why hospital owner-
ship of physician organizations led to higher total expenditures per patient, Robinson 
and Miller reasoned that higher expenditures could be driven by increased use of 
higher-priced services, but it could also be due to higher volume of services, or both.114 
A merger between hospitals and physicians may also allow the merged entity to 
charge higher prices for certain outpatient services by exploiting the fact that 
hospital-based services are typically reimbursed at higher rates than identical ser-
vices provided in physician-based locations.115 This pricing practice is called the site-
of-service differential and is cited as one of the financial incentives driving hospital-
physician integration.116 The site-of-service differential exists in Medicare 
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 116. See Neprash et al., supra note 100, at 1933–34.  
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reimbursement policy and is replicated in the commercial market.117 In Capps, 
Dranove, and Ody’s research finding that vertical integration between hospitals and 
physicians increased physician prices, they estimate that about a quarter of the 14% 
price increase resulted from exploitation of reimbursement methodologies that allow 
hospitals to charge facility fees for employed physicians.118 In the study by Neprash 
et al., the site-of-service differential explained part of the increase in prices for 
outpatient services experienced by those areas experiencing the highest increase in 
hospital-physician integration.119  
C. Agency Problems and Consumer Choice 
Hospital ownership of physician practices may exacerbate agency problems be-
tween physicians and patients. Agency problems arise between patients (the princi-
pals) and physicians (their agents) when physicians’ medical decisions on behalf of 
their patients are influenced by the physicians’ financial incentives and practice 
norms that may be at odds with the patients’ interests in obtaining the highest quality 
care at the lowest price.120 In the context of hospital services, the physician both or-
ders and performs the hospital service, thus driving demand not only for the type of 
service but also for the particular facility at which the service will be performed.121  
Theoretically, it is unclear what effect vertical integration of hospitals and physi-
cians may have on agency problems between physicians and patients. On the one 
hand, common ownership could align the financial incentives between hospitals and 
physicians, and thus improve care coordination and patient welfare.122 However, 
hospital ownership of physicians could also create financial and other incentives for 
the physician to refer to the owner-hospital or to increase the volume or intensity of 
                                                                                                                 
 
 117. See MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM’N., REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: MEDICARE 
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services ordered, rather than to choose the most cost-effective option for the 
patient.123  
In a study that examined the impact of hospital-physician integration on the pa-
tient’s choice of hospital, Laurence Baker, M. Kate Bundorf, and Daniel Kessler 
found empirical evidence that hospital ownership of physicians worsens the agency 
problem between physicians and patients.124 They found that “a hospital’s ownership 
of an admitting physician dramatically increases the probability that the physician’s 
patients will choose the owning hospital. . . . [P]atients are more likely to choose a 
high-cost, low-quality hospital when their admitting physician’s practice is owned 
by that hospital.”125 Although they were unable to determine whether, on net, the 
harms of vertical integration to patient welfare outweigh the potential benefits, the 
authors concluded that “hospital/physician integration affects patients’ hospital 
choices in a way that is inconsistent with their best interests.”126 
Even when providers have the right motives for integrating, when large conglom-
erates gain market power, they tend to use it to command higher prices. Taken to-
gether, the empirical picture of vertical integration in health care suggests some 
emerging themes: first, tighter forms of integration (e.g., acquisition versus contrac-
tual affiliation) are associated with greater increases in prices; second, the greater the 
market share of the hospital entity prior to consolidation, the more likely the merger 
will have anticompetitive effects; and third, the harms to consumer welfare go be-
yond higher prices and include incentives to refer patients to lower-value facilities 
or higher-cost settings. In addition, there is a noted absence of empirical data illus-
trating that vertically integrated health care systems improve quality127 or reliably 
generate cost savings through reduced utilization or improved efficiency.128 
Although there may be limits on the generalizability of any one of the studies, it is 
notable that all the data point in the same direction: that vertical health care integra-
tion is associated with increased prices and higher per patient health care spending. 
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III. THE CENTRAL ROLE OF STATES 
Due to significant inefficiencies in the health care markets and the limits of federal 
antitrust enforcement, states have an important role to play to complement and sup-
port federal efforts to address the competitive threats of health care integration. When 
market power abuses lead to higher prices and reductions in quality and consumer 
choice, the primary remedy has been federal antitrust enforcement. But while federal 
antitrust enforcement has a key role to play, it cannot be the only weapon in the 
arsenal. First, given the rapid rate of collaboration and consolidation in health care, 
the Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Justice (the Antitrust 
Agencies) simply do not have the resources or capacity to police all of the consoli-
dation efforts under way throughout the country.129 Second, federal antitrust enforce-
ment offers a powerful means of preventing anticompetitive mergers and collabora-
tions but has proven less successful at balancing the pro- and anticompetitive effects 
of a proposed merger or correcting anticompetitive conduct following consolida-
tion.130 At a time when state and federal governments are incentivizing vertical inte-
gration, and in which the majority of health care markets in the United States are 
already highly concentrated,131 policy makers need more nuanced tools that they can 
deploy throughout the country.  
States are in a unique position to assist in this effort. First, state governments 
oversee most of the regulation of insurance and health care within the state, which 
will enable them to design new policies that complement existing regulatory struc-
tures. For instance, states could require payers to report all of their claims to a state 
all-payer claims database (APCD)132 to promote a better understanding of the drivers 
of health care prices and provide federal antitrust agencies with valuable information 
on markets throughout the state. Second, state actors may have existing relationships 
with market stakeholders and a better understanding of market dynamics in local 
health care markets, which can improve policy selection. Third, state attorneys gen-
eral have broader mandates than federal antitrust enforcement agencies, which en-
able them to analyze the actions of health care providers and insurer organizations 
through a consumer-protection or community-benefits lens, broadening both the 
range of harms that are evaluated and potential enforcement tools. Fourth, allowing 
states to monitor the impact of vertical integration in a wide variety of market settings 
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and try different regulatory approaches will speed understanding of whether and un-
der what circumstances the benefits of engaging in vertical integration outweigh the 
risks. Finally, states can learn and exchange best practices for developing APCDs 
and other regulatory models, easing the transition for states with less experience.133 
Enhancing state and federal collaboration will expand both the information and pol-
icy tools available to regulators aiming to control health care costs, as well as allow 
available resources to be targeted to the most appropriate entities and markets. 
Increasing state involvement does create some risks. Most importantly, the exist-
ence of relationships between market stakeholders and government officials also 
risks agency capture and undue political influence over legislation and regulation.134 
Many states have had well-intentioned policy initiatives, such as certificate-of-need 
laws and licensure programs, co-opted by political and financial interests.135 In states 
with powerful health provider or insurance entities, maintaining the independence of 
the APCD and oversight entities will be essential. For example, the Massachusetts 
legislature created the Massachusetts Health Policy Commission (HPC) as an inde-
pendent state agency that resides in, but is not under the control of, the Executive 
Office of Administration and Finance. HPC is “not subject to the supervision and 
control of any other executive office, department, commission, board, bureau, 
agency or political subdivision of the commonwealth.”136 Instead, an eleven-member 
Board of Commissioners with guidance from a broadly representative advisory coun-
cil govern the agency.137 HPC is funded solely by assessments taken from industry 
participants rather than from state general revenue.138 Given the wealth and political 
power of many insurance companies and health care systems, state legislatures 
should carefully insulate any oversight entities in terms of both governance and 
funding. 
Further, state regulation without the requisite expertise and resources to engage 
in continued oversight and enforcement risks exacerbating existing problems. Re-
cently, several states have offered immunity from state and federal antitrust laws to 
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vertically integrating health care entities, which drew criticism from federal officials 
who argued the practice potentially immunizes anticompetitive behavior and results 
in consumer harm if the states fail to appropriately oversee and regulate the enti-
ties.139 As successful oversight and enforcement measures often require substantial 
financial, personnel, and knowledge-based resources, states must carefully assess 
which policy options are best suited to their particular circumstances. In addition, 
federal and state government officials should collaborate and coordinate their efforts 
as much as possible to promote efficient oversight and regulation of health care 
integration. 
Vertical integration in health care continues to be encouraged by state and federal 
government entities as a means to control overutilization and promote quality. To 
maintain control over the amount of consolidation in the health care market and guide 
entities in how to structure their integrations in ways that promote competition, regu-
lators need improved information on how integration may lead to abuses of market 
power, greater guidance on the appropriate balance between pro- and anticompetitive 
effects, and more nuanced oversight and regulatory tools. With the limits of federal 
antitrust tools to address vertical integration in health care, states are uniquely situ-
ated to manage the price and quality effects of the emerging forms of health care 
combinations, but they must be cognizant of the political risks, resources, and com-
petencies necessary to take on such a role. As set forth in Part IV, this federalized, 
“laboratory of the states” model allows jurisdictions to tailor policies to the specifics 
of the state’s own health care markets.  
IV. STATE OPTIONS TO ADDRESS THE DOUBLE-EDGED SWORD 
Because of the limits of federal antitrust enforcement and of market forces to dis-
cipline private health care prices, states have the opportunity to complement and sup-
plement federal efforts to address the potential harm to competition from increased 
health care consolidation. The double-edged sword of health care integration requires 
states to grapple with ways to balance the potential efficiency benefits while control-
ling the price effects of consolidation. To do so, states can encourage clinical inte-
gration, but with a quid pro quo that the integrating entities must submit to price and 
quality oversight.  
Part IV explores a range of policy options states can use to further these ends. The 
strategies include: (A) all-payer claims databases; (B) antitrust enforcement and im-
munity; (C) ACO certification; (D) rate-oversight authorities; (E) private rate caps; 
and (F) provider rate regulation.  
These policy options for state oversight of health care integration are explored in 
order of least to most regulatory intervention in the market, which also generally 
correlates to political difficulty. Although the best combination of these tools will 
depend on the specific market and political dynamics in each particular state, as a 
general matter, the more consolidated and concentrated a state’s health care market, 
the more the state may have to rely on the stronger regulatory devices to curb rising 
health care prices. 
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While states may pick and choose from this menu of policy options, three key 
ingredients emerge for effective state oversight of vertical integration and private 
price increases: (1) Information—oversight bodies must have access to detailed and 
timely price, quality, and utilization claim data; (2) Independence—state oversight 
bodies must be insulated from the powerful providers they oversee; (3) Regulatory 
Authority—state oversight bodies must have the authority to enforce or impose limits 
on providers’ prices when they become too high. 
A. All-Payer Claims Databases 
To evaluate the impact of integration on health care costs and quality, states must 
first gain access to reliable data about their health care prices, quality of care, and 
market dynamics. This information will inform the analysis of the role that market 
leverage, as opposed to value, plays in setting negotiated health care prices. 
 Obtaining negotiated health care prices will not be an easy task. Private health 
care prices are notoriously opaque and difficult to ascertain.140 Different plans pay 
the same provider different prices for the same service. Providers’ charges vary 
wildly from each other for the same service in the same geographic areas.141 Further-
more, nondisclosure agreements, trade secrets claims, and highly complex billing 
mechanisms shroud health care prices in a veil of secrecy.142 But states can get 
around many of these barriers by requiring disclosure of the information to a state 
entity.143  
About a third of all states currently require disclosure of health care claims to an 
all-payer claims database (APCD).144 APCDs are large-scale, state-run databases that 
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collect health care claims data and provider data from all payers in the state, includ-
ing private insurers, Medicaid, the Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP), 
self-insured employers, dental insurers, prescription drug plans, state employee 
health plans, and others. Furthermore, several APCDs pair price and quality data for 
providers.145 States generally use APCDs to collect data on patient demographics, 
diagnoses, services rendered, charges, payments, and procedure codes.146 According 
to the APCD Council, a nonprofit entity that monitors APCD creation, eighteen states 
have enacted legislation to create an APCD, with another twenty states demonstrat-
ing a strong interest in doing so.147  
APCDs are often thought of as tools for promoting consumer price transpar-
ency,148 but their functions go far beyond providing pricing information to consum-
ers. For example, by marrying claims data with quality assessments, APCDs can al-
low policy makers to monitor the impact of vertical integration on price and quality 
under various market conditions. Given the experimental nature of ACOs, access to 
data is essential to evaluating whether they can achieve their procompetitive goals of 
promoting quality improvement and cost-saving efficiency, or whether their poten-
tial anticompetitive effects outweigh any consumer benefit. For instance, policy mak-
ers will need to know whether vertical integration in their market changes provider 
referral patterns in ways that harm quality of care or patient outcomes. With all the 
changes set in motion by the ACA, it is essential to be able to learn from experience 
and adapt regulations quickly in response to shifting market dynamics.149  
The collection of APCD data both underlies and informs all of the subsequent 
policy options discussed below and should be a precursor to the selection of an ap-
proach to manage the double-edged sword of health care integration and consolida-
tion. Policy makers could use APCD data to implement policy incentives targeting 
consumers, purchasers, providers, and payers. For instance, if a dominant provider 
engaged in anticompetitive conduct to drive up prices to supracompetitive levels, the 
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state could consider bringing an antitrust enforcement action, implementing some 
form of rate regulation, or finding ways to incentivize market entry.  
While the creation of an APCD presents numerous opportunities and benefits, 
doing so also raises significant challenges. Without question, the creation and 
maintenance of any statewide database will require substantial financial support and 
resources. However, with APCDs, obtaining a usable, standardized, and complete set 
of data from various payers and providers poses the biggest challenge. For example, 
all quality, price, and patient data must be converted to standardized metrics and all 
patient data must be de-identified. Given the confidential nature of the database, the 
state will also need to impose significant data-security measures. States may also 
face additional challenges from providers and insurers claiming that the pricing data 
constitutes a trade secret or is subject to a nondisclosure agreement.150 State legisla-
tures can address many of these concerns directly by requiring payers and providers 
to submit health care claims data in standardized formats to the state APCD and in-
cluding a provision that exempts APCD reporting requirements from nondisclosure 
agreements and trade secrets claims.151 
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court recently dealt a significant blow to state 
APCDs in Gobeille v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.152 The 6-2 opinion held that the 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) preempts state APCD reporting 
requirements for self-funded employee health plans, depriving states of essential in-
formation on health care utilization, pricing, and quality.153 Nationally, 61% of work-
ers with employer-based health insurance are in self-funded plans, which represents 
a significant portion of the population state health policy makers aim to target with 
healthcare reforms.154 Moreover, individuals with employer-based health insurance 
tend to be healthier than those covered by public payers, so removing claims data for 
a majority of individuals with employer-based coverage from the database can skew 
the data and undermine the accuracy of any policy analysis performed using the data.155 
States seeking to obtain claims data for employees with self-insured employers 
have three options after Gobeille.156 First, states could gather and analyze the more 
limited set of health care claims data by continuing to require APCD data from all 
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other types of payers, including fully insured employee-benefit plans, public payers, 
and individual and small-group plans within and outside the exchanges, and by en-
couraging self-insured employee health plans to submit information on a voluntary 
basis.157 Second, despite being less efficient and more expensive than obtaining the 
data from payers, states could require health care providers to submit the missing 
data from self-insured employees.158 Finally, states could request that the federal 
government, via the Departments of Labor and Health and Human Services, mandate 
collection of relevant claims data from ERISA plans.159 A federal requirement could 
standardize data for inclusion in all state APCDs, which could facilitate data analysis 
and comparison between states.  
A final challenge is that creation of an APCD requires significant thought regard-
ing the amount and scope of data disclosure. Several antitrust enforcers and academ-
ics have expressed concerns that, depending on the market dynamics, widespread 
disclosure of all health care price and quality data could lead to increased prices or 
collusion.160 Determining which data to disclose, to whom, and in which market, will 
require substantial analysis and oversight, which again requires resources.  
Despite these numerous challenges, states need comprehensive health care price, 
utilization, and quality data to inform their health care cost-containment policies. 
Thus, states must strive to collect and access this data notwithstanding these chal-
lenges. Information forms the basis of any effective state action to address to the 
competitive risks of health care integration and consolidation.  
B. Antitrust Enforcement and Immunity 
Having reliable data will greatly facilitate state decision making on when to in-
centivize or curtail health care integration. States can manipulate the use of state and 
federal antitrust laws to either vigorously challenge anticompetitive conduct or im-
munize certain actors from prosecution under the laws via the state action doctrine. 
A state with highly concentrated health care markets can actively enforce state and 
federal antitrust laws to prevent proposed integration from harming competition. 
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Alternatively, states can encourage integration by granting state action immunity 
from state and federal antitrust laws to integrated health care entities via legislation 
or Certificates of Public Advantage (COPAs).161 Regardless of a state’s chosen path, 
vigorous oversight and significant data monitoring will be essential to controlling 
costs and preserving quality in the face of increased concentration. 
1. Antitrust Enforcement  
States can challenge anticompetitive conduct by enforcement of the federal or its 
own state antitrust laws. At the federal level, the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act 
prohibit anticompetitive mergers, collaborations, and conduct.162 In addition, forty-
nine states have their own antitrust laws that promote and protect competition.163 
Given the market-specific information required to bring an antitrust enforcement 
challenge, state officials are well positioned to identify integration proposals that 
threaten to harm competition. State attorneys general can challenge mergers and col-
laborations and bring enforcement actions both independently and in conjunction 
with a federal action. Joining with the federal antitrust agencies to bring an action 
can be an especially effective means for states to leverage both the expertise and 
resources of the federal agencies as well as their own knowledge of existing market 
dynamics.164  
State attorneys general, like the federal antitrust agencies, generally have the op-
portunity to review a proposed integration, which could be a formal merger or a 
looser collaboration, both at the time of its creation and on an ongoing basis. While 
the antitrust analysis typically differs between horizontal mergers, vertical mergers, 
and collaborations, the FTC generally considers similar factors when addressing 
health care provider integrations.165 At the time of a proposed integration, antitrust 
enforcers initially consider whether a proposed merger or collaboration is per se il-
legal.166 Initial concerns for enforcers include (1) whether the integration could create 
potential efficiencies such as cost savings, quality improvement, and transactional 
efficiencies; (2) whether the proposed integration is a legitimate attempt to achieve 
those efficiencies or a means to enhance market power; and (3) whether the 
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efficiency goals could be obtained through a means that poses less of a threat to 
competition.167 For an existing entity, enforcers consider whether the current conduct 
of the entity is on balance harming competition. If on initial review the state finds 
that its antitrust concerns are not satisfied, it can engage in further investigation. 
Given the potential benefits of vertical integration in health care, the majority of 
proposed integrations should survive initial review and not be challenged as per se 
illegal. Once a bona fide integration is established, antitrust enforcers will review the 
integration under a “rule of reason” standard.168 As the Director of the FTC’s Bureau 
of Competition Deborah Feinstein pointed out at the Fifth National Accountable Care 
Organization Summit in June 2014, “the rule of reason analysis applied to provider 
collaborations generally follows the same framework contained in the Horizontal 
Merger Guidelines.”169 The rule of reason analysis compares the state of competition 
with and without the proposed integration and requires the parties to define the rele-
vant product and geographic markets, identify the market participants, calculate mar-
ket shares and concentration, consider the likelihood of market expansion, and de-
termine whether any efficiencies are likely to result.170 Antitrust enforcers will 
further examine whether the proposed integration will likely harm competition by 
increasing “the ability or incentive profitably to raise price above or reduce output, 
quality, service, or innovation below what likely would prevail” in its absence.171 
Rule of reason analysis is flexible and market specific in its inquiry, and no one factor 
is dispositive.172  
The most challenging question facing antitrust enforcers in the case of vertical 
integration is whether the purported procompetitive effects of the integration will 
outweigh any anticompetitive effects. Before antitrust enforcers will credit any pro-
competitive efficiencies, the health care entities must demonstrate that the claimed 
efficiencies are sufficiently cognizable, explicit, and require the proposed level of 
integration (merger, joint venture, or affiliation) to produce the procompetitive ef-
fects.173 Doing so has proven extremely difficult.174 For instance, the Ninth Circuit 
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Court of Appeals found in Saint Alphonsus Medical Center-Nampa, Inc. v. St. Luke’s 
Health System that the quality benefits obtained from sharing electronic medical rec-
ords, standardizing treatment protocols, and integrating physicians across practices 
did not require a formal merger; that is, they were not “merger specific.”175 Although 
the Ninth Circuit decided St. Luke’s based purely on the anticompetitive potential of 
the proposed horizontal merger of primary care physician practices in Nampa, Idaho, 
the principle that a merger was not necessary to achieve the purported efficiencies 
would also apply in the analysis of a vertical merger.  
The complexity of vertical health care integrations will significantly complicate 
antitrust analysis.176 Vertical integrations can harm competition in upstream and 
downstream markets, as well as in entirely different markets.177 For example, Health 
First, an integrated delivery system in Brevard, Florida, owns and operates health 
plans, hospitals, physician groups, urgent care centers, outpatient centers, rehabilita-
tion facilities, diagnostic and treatment centers, and a network of fitness and wellness 
services.178 In these cases, it will not be sufficient to analyze only the impact of the 
integration in each market in isolation, but instead antitrust enforcers and courts 
should analyze the more global impact of the integration on the particular health care 
market. This makes conducting the competitive effects analysis significantly more 
complex.179 Further, state enforcers may have to consider how to balance pro-
competitive effects in one market, such as primary care, with anticompetitive effects 
in an altogether different market, such as surgical procedures, or whether quality im-
provements for certain services outweigh across the board price increases.180 All of 
this will require extensive amounts of time, resources, data, and analysis to accom-
plish in any meaningful way. 
However, once a state has decided that a proposed or existing integration is anti-
competitive, it must decide upon a remedy. The goal of any antitrust enforcement 
action is to restore the opportunity for the market to function without the illegal re-
straints on competition.181 Antitrust enforcers generally have two kinds of equitable 
remedies to choose from: structural and conduct remedies. Depending on the timing 
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of the action and the market conditions, states can use structural and conduct reme-
dies alone or in combination to address anticompetitive concerns arising from greater 
consolidation in health care.  
a. Structural Remedies 
Antitrust enforcers use structural remedies to prevent a proposed merger, to undo 
a recent merger, or to require divestiture or other structural change in order to restore 
competition.182 In the instance that a vertically integrated entity has not yet or only 
recently formed, structural remedies offer a relatively straightforward means of re-
storing competition by dissolving the integration. Given the level of concentration in 
both the health care insurance and provider markets, antitrust enforcers have ex-
pressed a strong preference for structural remedies,183 as preventing anticompetitive 
harms prior to consolidation has proven more successful than attempting to address 
them after the entities have fully integrated.184  
While structural remedies are frequently used to prevent horizontal mergers, their 
use in vertical mergers has rarely occurred because antitrust enforcers generally view 
vertical integration as procompetitive.185 However, given the evidence that vertical 
health care integration can increase provider market leverage and prices, antitrust 
enforcers should consider structural remedies, both when evaluating proposed verti-
cal integrations and when an existing consolidated entity continues to amass or abuse 
its market power.186  
In the case of proposed vertical integrations, antitrust enforcers should consider 
structural remedies in three instances. First, they should be especially wary of pro-
posed integrations that appear overinclusive in the number of hospitals and/or phy-
sicians participating in the integration, as this may signal an attempt to gain market 
power in ways that are unnecessary to the efficiency goals of vertical integration.187 
Second, in instances where the integration would involve a significant number of 
providers in a particular area, questions arise regarding whether those providers are 
eligible to see patients independently from the entity or subject to exclusivity require-
ments and whether the integration will substantially limit consumer choice. Third, 
vertical integrations that consolidate market power across several different provider 
markets can create significant leverage in negotiating reimbursements, such that the 
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entity becomes a “must have” and threatens the ability of other organizations to compete.188  
Despite the oft-repeated reminder that mergers, once consummated, are difficult, 
if not impossible, to unwind, the highly concentrated nature of U.S. health care mar-
kets suggests antitrust enforcers should seriously consider using structural remedies 
to break down some of the market leverage some providers have amassed over the 
last several decades.189 Over the last several decades, health care entities have come 
to rely on the fact that mergers, once consummated, will not be undone. As a result, 
health care entities have strong incentives to consolidate, even in the face of in-
creased monitoring or limitations via conduct remedies, because the limitations are 
only temporary, but the gain in market power is permanent. In many markets, health 
care provider organizations have systematically accumulated market power and 
abused it in ways that have significantly increased costs and eliminated competitors. 
Such abuses of power could result in anticompetitive conduct claims under Section 
1 of the Sherman Act or monopolization and attempted monopolization claims under 
Section 2 of the Sherman Act.190 Antitrust enforcers have the authority to break this 
market power down in two ways: division of a larger entity into several smaller enti-
ties191 or required divestitures in certain geographic regions.192 The most prominent 
example of division of an existing entity into smaller ones occurred in 1983 when 
the Department of Justice successfully litigated its case against AT&T, resulting in 
the divestiture of several “Baby Bells.”193 Assistant Attorney General William Baxter 
created the “Bell Doctrine” to prevent local telephone service providers from lever-
aging their legally acquired monopolies in local markets to monopolize the national 
long distance market.194 While the Bell Doctrine was designed for regulated 
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monopolies, many of its principles can be analogized to dominant health care 
organizations.195 A successful state or federal antitrust challenge resulting in 
divestitures, or other structural remedies dividing the entity into smaller parts, would 
serve as a strong deterrent to other entities.  
In sum, state antitrust enforcers should use structural remedies to prevent poten-
tially anticompetitive collaborations and mergers from existing, and to break up those 
integrated entities that systematically amass and abuse market power.  
b. Conduct Remedies 
The majority of vertical integrations, however, are unlikely to require structural 
remedies, as they will present substantial procompetitive effects that are not so 
clearly outweighed by potential harm to competition. In these instances, conduct 
remedies are more frequently used to curb anticompetitive behaviors. State and fed-
eral antitrust enforcers have typically used conduct remedies to address anti-
competitive concerns arising from vertical mergers and joint ventures; the agencies 
believed that conduct remedies would enable an entity to gain the procompetitive 
benefits of the vertical integration while still restricting any potential anticompetitive 
conduct.196 
 Conduct remedies can be used in two ways to regulate the anticompetitive harms 
that may arise from vertical integration. First, conduct remedies provide a means to 
limit anticompetitive behavior in a health care entity that has obtained a significant 
amount of market power without requiring it to divest portions of its business in ways 
that may compromise patient care.197 Second, for entities that are integrating to create 
an ACO or other form of integrated delivery system, conduct remedies offer a tool 
to protect competition in ways that are tailored to the concerns of a particular market, 
while still enabling providers the opportunity to achieve the desired procompetitive 
effects of clinical integration. 
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The use of vertical integration and ACOs to control costs and improve quality in 
health care is still largely experimental. Like any experiment, the model will require 
iterative refinement and oversight to improve its results. Conduct remedies permit 
this iterative process to continue to maximize the benefits of integration, while mini-
mizing the harm to competition. For example, depending on the concerns in a particu-
lar market, antitrust enforcers could impose direct price caps, limits on total health 
care expenditures, limits on contract provisions,198 requirements to preserve existing 
services, prohibitions on employment restrictions, and limits on further acquisitions 
on health care providers.  
But using conduct remedies effectively is challenging. Historically, the antitrust 
agencies have not favored the use of conduct remedies to control the anticompetitive 
effects of proposed horizontal mergers or collaborations.199 Their logic is relevant to 
vertical integration as well. First, unlike structural remedies, conduct remedies do 
not restore the status quo with respect to competition.200 Instead, they provide re-
strictions and oversight over the newly integrated entity, which are often inferior 
substitutes for competition between independent providers.201 For instance, direct 
price caps have been used to control cost increases following a merger, but it is not 
clear if the price caps are higher than what a competitive market would permit.202 
Further, conduct remedies often focus on price, but they are unable to take account 
of other impacts of competition like quality improvement and innovation.203 Second, 
conduct remedies are often difficult to enforce and have high administrative costs.204 
Enforcing conduct remedies requires the enforcement agency to either oversee en-
forcement itself or hire a third party to monitor the entity, both of which require 
substantial resources. In some instances, enforcement can be so expensive and bur-
densome that the remedy can be self-defeating. Finally, conduct remedies are gener-
ally time-limited, which begs the question of what happens when the consent decree 
ends. Health care entities may find it financially rewarding to consolidate and accept 
the conduct remedies and oversight in the short term to obtain greater market lever-
age in the future.  
In comparison to their federal counterparts, state attorneys general may be better 
positioned and more willing to use conduct remedies. State officials will be more 
familiar with local stakeholders and market dynamics, and they may be more willing 
to engage in conduct oversight than to litigate a merger challenge. For instance, the 
Pennsylvania Attorney General has successfully negotiated three consent decrees 
since 2011 with Geisinger Health System.205 The most recent decree, involving 
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Geisinger’s acquisition of Lewiston Health Care Foundation, required caps on price 
increases and prohibited most-favored-nation and anti-tiering provisions.206  
In Massachusetts, the then-Attorney General, Martha Coakley, negotiated an ex-
tensive consent decree with Partners Healthcare conditioning its acquisition of South 
Shore Hospital and two Hallmark hospitals on several factors including (1) caps on 
price increases and total health care expenditures; (2) component contracting, which 
permits health plans to contract with all or some of Partners’s four major compo-
nents; (3) limitations on Partners’s ability to contract with payers on behalf of affili-
ated providers; (4) preservation of existing services; and (5) Attorney General ap-
proval for any further acquisitions.207 The Partners consent decree was ultimately 
rejected after substantial opposition from the Massachusetts Health Policy 
Commission (HPC),208 which estimated that the merger would result in approxi-
mately forty million dollars in increased health care expenditures per year and 
Partners having more discharges than the next four largest competitors in the state 
combined.209 HPC’s impact on the outcome of the Partners merger demonstrates the 
importance of states having readily available access to price, quality, and utilization 
data for analysis. If the financial impact of the proposed Partners acquisition had not 
been so significant, HPC would have been well-suited to oversee the merger and the 
conditions of the consent decree. Few states have an agency that has the data, ana-
lytical tools, authority, and resources that HPC does to monitor an actor’s health care 
system and its costs. Although it has only been in existence for three years, HPC has 
already played a large role in shaping the future of health care in Massachusetts, and 
its role in antitrust enforcement will continue to develop. Other states interested in 
regulating health care costs should follow HPC’s lead, using its progress and set-
backs as guidance for policy design. 
Overall, antitrust enforcement is an essential tool for states to curb increases in 
health care costs driven by abuses of provider and payer market power. But it can be 
too blunt or unwieldy an instrument to strike the delicate balance needed to promote 
beneficial integration in health care while preventing providers and payers from ac-
quiring too much market power. In some instances, legislation may be preferable to 
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conduct remedies for behavior that states wish to curb across all actors, like all-or-
nothing provisions or most-favored-nation clauses. If enforcers fear eliminating pro-
competitive efficiencies, they may opt to delay enforcement in ways that can cause 
lasting harm to competition. Likewise, if used too aggressively, the threat of antitrust 
enforcement could chill integration efforts. 
2. State Action Immunity and Certificates of Public Advantage 
In some instances, state and federal governments may wish to alleviate that 
chilling effect of antitrust law by signaling to health care entities that they favor pro-
moting integration over protecting competition. The courts have granted states the 
ability to regulate the market in ways that promote other policy goals even if those 
ways may harm competition.210 In Parker v. Brown, the Supreme Court granted states 
the ability to offer state action immunity, which would displace the antitrust laws in 
favor of public supervision, so long as their actions did not unduly burden interstate 
commerce or violate the Constitution.211 States seeking to exempt nonsovereign pri-
vate actors from state and federal antitrust enforcement must demonstrate that the 
exemption arises from a “clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed . . . state 
policy” and that the policy is “actively supervised by the State.”212 States can grant 
non-sovereign entities immunity through a range of actions including direct legisla-
tion, agency action, or by granting a certificate of public advantage (COPA). Cur-
rently, thirteen states have statutes authorizing the state to grant a COPA or state 
action immunity.213  
 It is unclear whether state action immunity has successfully promoted beneficial 
integration while protecting competition. In recent years, use of state action 
immunity has come under significant scrutiny, especially in health care, as several 
states had granted immunity without proper articulation of state purpose or 
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supervision.214 Robert Berenson and Randall Bovbjerg performed an extensive case 
study of a COPA granted in North Carolina that enabled Mission Health System 
(“Mission”) in Asheville to acquire its major rival, St. Joseph’s Health System.215 
North Carolina granted Mission a COPA in exchange for an agreement to a “quasi-
regulatory” regime that controlled Mission’s overall profit margins, its average 
inpatient and outpatient costs, and the share of primary physicians it could employ.216 
After analyzing years of data, the researchers were unable to conclude that the COPA 
effectively counteracted the loss of competition in the area, but they did find that the 
model had some successes and with modifications “a COPA-like approach could 
provide a useful complement to antitrust enforcement in addressing market 
power.”217 
If carefully limited and executed properly, a COPA may offer a state several bene-
fits over antitrust enforcement alone. First, it could give states the ability to experi-
ment with vertical integration in health care in ways that attempt to balance the bene-
fits of clinical integration with the risks to competition. Second, protection from 
antitrust prosecution offers health care entities further incentive to submit to data 
reporting and monitoring that can provide essential information on the impact of ver-
tical integration in different market conditions. Such data would also enable states to 
monitor the impact of various forms of antitrust immunity on price or utilization as 
a result of a merger over time. Finally, properly executed state action immunity could 
offer the opportunity to closely monitor and regulate far more health care entities 
than federal enforcement agencies could cover alone and for longer periods of time 
than conduct remedies.  
But the state must have a clearly defined regulatory body assigned to monitor and 
regulate the entities, as well as the financial and personnel resources to do so. A 
COPA that grants antitrust immunity without appropriate oversight risks significant 
harm to consumers. In fact, federal antitrust enforcement officials have recently 
raised significant concerns about whether state action immunity may do more harm 
than good.218 Edith Ramirez, Chairwoman of the FTC, expressed concerns that in 
some states the grant of antitrust immunity in an effort to promote collaboration and 
integration “betrays a misunderstanding of the crucial role that competition plays in 
the healthcare sector.”219 She reiterated the careful balancing that federal antitrust 
enforcement agencies conduct when reviewing a proposed merger or collaboration, 
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including a weighing of the procompetitive and anticompetitive effects of a proposed 
integration.220 Without careful supervision and narrowly defined limits on the scope 
of antitrust immunity, COPAs and grants of state action immunity risk exacerbating 
antitrust concerns rather than ameliorating them.  
The FTC further demonstrated its skepticism of COPAs and state action immunity 
recently with respect to New York’s COPA for health care collaboratives.221 In re-
viewing an application for a COPA, New York considers (1) the potential benefits 
of the health care provider collaborative activities, including preservation of needed 
health care services, improvement in quality and access to services, lower costs, and 
improvements in payment methodologies; (2) the health care provider landscape; 
(3) the potential disadvantages of the collaborative activities; (4) the availability of 
alternatives that would be less harmful to competition; and (5) the extent to which 
active supervision will mitigate the risks associated with the collaboration.222 Despite 
its review process, New York’s COPA immunity raised substantial concerns at the 
FTC that such immunity would promote anticompetitive behavior arising from 
healthcare integration.223 On April 22, 2015, the FTC sent a letter to the Center for 
Health Care Policy and Resource Development in New York, claiming that the FTC 
fully recognized the potential procompetitive benefits that can arise from health care 
collaborations but that the COPA exemptions “are based on inaccurate premises 
about the antitrust laws and the value of collaboration among health care provid-
ers.”224 The FTC found that a COPA was unnecessary to enable providers to engage 
in procompetitive collaborative activities, but it threatened to “immunize conduct 
that would not generate efficiencies and therefore not pass muster under the antitrust 
laws.”225 The FTC went on to argue that the COPA risked increasing health care costs 
and decreasing access to consumers in New York. States considering offering state 
action immunity through legislation or a COPA program must be aware of FTC’s 
concerns and carefully condition the immunity on significant data reporting require-
ments, regulatory oversight, and explicit boundaries of antitrust exemption.226  
In general, while we favor incentivizing health insurers and providers to provide 
price and quality data, we remain skeptical that offering immunity to state and federal 
antitrust laws is an advisable means of doing so. States with no other options should 
consider creating clear price, quality, and concentration thresholds that would trigger 
revocation of the immunity. 
States must determine how to best employ their antitrust laws to promote 
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competition and efficiency in the health care markets. Data collection and analysis 
of health care prices, insurance premiums, utilization rates, and quality of care will 
be essential to this effort. Such data would enable state officials to identify 
anticompetitive collaborations as early as possible, and seek to revoke immunity or 
engage in some form of antitrust enforcement if entities violated the terms of the 
immunity. While states have a significant role to play in antitrust enforcement, as 
Robert Berenson previously noted, antitrust enforcement “can only be one—and not 
the primary—approach to addressing provider pricing power.”227 
C. ACO Certification 
To monitor the impact of vertical integration on price, quality, and competition, 
state certification programs can offer a more comprehensive and preferable alterna-
tive to COPAs and state action immunity. Unlike the regulatory approval and report-
ing requirements for Medicare ACOs, there is no regime of oversight for commercial 
ACOs. States can take a more active role overseeing health care integration, particu-
larly commercial ACOs, by creating Certificate of Authority programs. States can 
tailor the Certificate of Authority requirements to enable them to achieve their 
particular policy goals. Key considerations include determining which state entity 
will oversee the certification, whether certification will be mandatory or voluntary, 
whether to require antitrust and solvency reviews, what price and quality disclosures 
to require, and whether to incentivize integration by granting antitrust immunity and 
exemptions to other state laws.228 Certification programs also allow states to review 
these features of any particular ACO both prior to certification and on an ongoing 
basis. Gathering historical and ongoing price and quality data will enable states to 
monitor market dynamics, inform future decisions regarding integration, and support 
antitrust enforcement actions. 
To date, three states have established Certificate of Authority programs for com-
mercial ACOs—Texas, Massachusetts, and New York.229 The features of the three 
different programs reflect each state’s goals and concerns. Certification presents es-
sentially a quid pro quo, where the state offers a range of benefits to the integrating 
entity—typically an ACO—in exchange for a more in-depth review up front and 
continued oversight.230 Massachusetts has a voluntary ACO Certification Program 
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governed by the Massachusetts Health Policy Commission. ACOs seeking certifica-
tion must satisfy several minimum standards, including the use of alternative pay-
ment methodologies, providing medical and behavioral health services across the 
continuum, and allowing for health care price transparency in exchange for an HPC 
“seal of approval” and the opportunity for preferential contracting with state-funded 
insurance contracts.231 As to data gathering, HPC already requires all provider or-
ganizations of a certain size and scope to register and submit data on costs and 
charges to the Center for Health Information and Analysis, but any ACO applying 
for certification must also register as a provider and disclose such information re-
gardless of size or scope.232 While the ACO certification process and its requirements 
are still under development, HPC has yet to require a solvency review or offer further 
potential incentives for ACO formation, such as immunity or a safe harbor from state 
and federal antitrust laws, exemption from state self-referral, or other consumer pro-
tection laws.233 According to staff members at HPC, a seal of approval from the state 
“is a meaningful distinction in a competitive marketplace, such as Massachusetts,”234 
which may provide sufficient incentive for ACO certification, negating the need for 
the state to grant such legal exemptions. 
In Texas, the Department of Insurance governs the certification of Health Care 
Collaboratives (HCCs), Texas’s version of ACOs.235 Certification is mandatory for 
the HCC to take on certain levels of financial risk, and the program focuses mostly 
on the antitrust implications of HCCs.236 To obtain certification, an HCC must 
demonstrate the willingness and ability to increase collaboration and integration 
among health care providers; promote improvements in care quality and outcomes; 
reduce preventable medical errors; contain costs without jeopardizing quality; and 
gather, analyze, and report statistics on health care costs, quality, access, and utiliza-
tion.237 In addition, the HCC must fund and engage in an in-depth antitrust review 
that provides evidence that the proposed collaboration is not likely to harm competi-
tion and that the procompetitive effects of the collaboration outweigh any anti-
competitive effects of increased market power.238 Having the applicants fund the re-
views saves state resources, but may also discourage health care entities from 
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forming HCCs. To date, no health care provider organization has applied for certifi-
cation as an HCC in Texas, and so whether this type of certification serves to protect 
competition or discourage integration remains uncertain.  
In contrast to Massachusetts and Texas, New York’s voluntary certificate of au-
thority for commercial ACOs both demands more of and offers more to applying 
ACOs. New York encourages clinical and financial integration by offering to exempt 
qualifying ACOs from prosecution under the corporate practice of medicine doctrine, 
state and federal antitrust laws, and prohibitions on fee splitting and self-referrals.239 
In exchange, the ACO must agree to “[p]rovide, manage and coordinate health 
care . . . for a defined population . . . ; [b]e accountable for quality, cost, and delivery 
of health care to ACO patients; [n]egotiate, receive and distribute any shared savings 
or losses; and [e]stablish, report and ensure provider compliance with health care 
criteria including quality performance standards.”240 In addition to the materials re-
quested for initial certification application, ACOs applying for a COPA must submit 
any additional information requested by the state during the COPA review process 
described above.241 
State certification of ACOs offers a means of incentivizing beneficial integration 
in health care while offering states the opportunity to gather valuable cost and quality 
data to determine the impact of such integration on the dynamics in the health care 
markets. States considering certification should monitor the success of 
Massachusetts, Texas, and New York to determine which elements of their programs 
to emulate. The design of an ACO certification program entails policy tradeoffs. For 
instance, mandatory certification enables states to guarantee oversight and access to 
essential cost and quality data, but it may create substantial barriers to ACO for-
mation, which states may still want to encourage. By contrast, the promise of state 
action immunity via a COPA may encourage ACO formation, but it may also unduly 
protect entities that engage in anticompetitive behavior and abuse market power. Fi-
nally, voluntary certification programs that do not offer significant benefits may not 
enroll many ACOs, which would significantly hinder the state’s ability to monitor 
and regulate the activities of integrating health care entities.  
D. Rate Oversight Authority 
A step beyond ACO certification models that only apply to certain forms of inte-
gration is to vest more widespread rate oversight authority in a rate oversight body. 
There are two models of oversight authority: (1) an independent rate commission that 
reviews and oversees provider rates; or (2) expanding the insurance rate review au-
thority of the state department of insurance. Authorities under both models can be 
vested with a spectrum of authority ranging from weaker reporting or recommenda-
tion power to stronger rate approval and enforcement power. To be effective, how-
ever, the rate oversight body should be insulated from capture by the providers or 
insurers it regulates and possess regulatory and enforcement authority to limit rate 
increases. 
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1. Rate Oversight Commission 
States can establish an independent rate oversight commission to oversee provid-
ers’ health care prices and transactions in their state. A rate oversight commission’s 
charge typically includes authority to study and make recommendations on proposed 
health care mergers and to monitor prices and quality data postmerger. But a more 
powerful oversight model vests the oversight commission with regulatory authority 
to enforce and limit excessive provider prices.  
In states that have established an APCD, a commission could have authority to 
analyze statewide claims data from the APCD to evaluate the pricing power, effi-
ciency, utilization, and quality of the existing provider landscape. Based on its find-
ings, the commission then makes recommendations and supplies data to both the 
state’s attorney general regarding proposed mergers or anticompetitive provider be-
havior and policy-making bodies regarding the need for regulatory intervention.242 
For example, if the commission observes that powerful providers are using anti-
tiering provisions in contracts with health plans to limit the ability of those health 
plans to steer members to lower cost or higher value providers, the commission could 
recommend enforcement action by the state attorney general, or legislation prohibit-
ing anti-tiering clauses in provider-plan contracts. A rate oversight commission also 
could be given more direct regulatory authority beyond simply monitoring and mak-
ing recommendations. For example, it might be granted the ability to implement price 
caps if prices rise beyond certain supracompetitive thresholds.  
To date, five states have established a rate-oversight commission: Delaware, 
Maryland, Massachusetts, New York, and Pennsylvania.243 Perhaps the most promi-
nent example of such a body is the Massachusetts Health Policy Commission. In 
terms of rate oversight, HPC has some regulatory authority, with the ability to require 
providers that exceed cost growth benchmarks to implement performance improve-
ment plans and fine them if the provider fails to comply.244 Along with HPC, rate 
oversight commissions in Delaware, New York, and Pennsylvania have authority to 
analyze price and cost data and make recommendations.245 The commission in 
Maryland, by contrast, has additional authority to approve and set inpatient and 
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outpatient rates and limit hospitals’ total revenues.246 In addition, in 2015 Colorado 
established a health care cost-containment commission with a three-year mandate to 
study the drivers of health care cost growth, analyze the state’s APCD and insurance 
rate review data, and make recommendations to the legislature.247  
A significant challenge to the effectiveness of an independent rate oversight com-
mission is protecting the body from regulatory capture.248 In particular, it is important 
to insulate the commission from undue influence from health care providers and 
powerful health systems who will resist oversight efforts and commission recom-
mendations that scrutinize or threaten their market power and pricing practices. The 
Massachusetts HPC, for example, was structured to avoid capture by requiring di-
verse representation, including those with experience as a health administrator, a 
health economist, a physician, and a representative from a variety of perspectives 
including consumer advocates, health insurance, health care workforce, and labor 
unions, among others.249 In addition, the members of the HPC may not be employed 
as a state executive branch official and may not be employed by, affiliated with, serve 
as a board member, or have a financial stake in any health care provider.250  
Another challenge is making sure the rate oversight commission coordinates with 
other existing government agencies and does not just add another regulatory body to 
the mix.251 To be effective, a commission must closely communicate with the APCD 
authority, the state attorney general, the department of insurance, certificate-of-need 
authorities, and others. Although it can be extremely valuable for a state to have an 
expert, independent commission to analyze APCD data and make policy or enforce-
ment recommendations, the most effective model of rate oversight commission must 
be vested with meaningful regulatory and enforcement authority—whether it is the 
power to approve provider budgets, impose limits on excessive prices or price in-
creases, or engage in rate regulation.  
2. Insurance Rate Review 
States could also increase the insurance rate review authority of the department 
of insurance. The ACA requires states to review proposed insurance rates for non-
grandfathered health plans and determine the reasonableness of any proposed rate 
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increase of more than 10%, but it does not require states to give prior-approval (or 
disapproval) authority over such rate hikes to the department of insurance.252 Pursu-
ant to these requirements, many states strengthened their insurance rate review func-
tions. States with prior-approval authority require health insurers to submit their rates 
to the department of insurance for prior approval, and the insurance commissioner 
has the authority to reject or reduce proposed rate increases.253 Other states give the 
insurance commissioner weaker “file-and-use” authority, where rates go into effect 
once they have been filed and the department has no ability to reject the rate in-
crease.254 States also vary in terms of which types of health insurance products (e.g., 
                                                                                                                 
 
 252. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg–94(c) (2012); 45 C.F.R. § 154.200 (2015). If the state does not 
establish an effective rate review authority, the Department of Health and Human Services 
shall determine the reasonableness of the proposed rate increase above 10%, but it does not 
have the authority to disapprove the rate. For more on the ACA’s insurance rate review re-
quirements and state rate review activities, see generally John Aloysius Cogan Jr., Health 
Insurance Rate Review, 88 TEMPLE L. REV. 411 (2016).  
 253. “Prior approval” authority generally means that the state insurance commissioner can 
approve, reject, or reduce proposed rate increases from insurers. If a rate is not disapproved or 
reduced by a deadline, it goes into effect. COMMUNITY CATALYST, RATE REVIEW: WHAT IS IT 
AND WHY DOES IT MATTER? 2 (2013), http://www.communitycatalyst.org/resources 
/publications/body/Rate-review-fact-sheet-FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/7E8G-CE4G]. The 
following states vest the insurance commissioner with prior approval authority: Alabama, 
ALA. CODE § 27-2-17 (LexisNexis 2014); Alaska, ALASKA STAT. § 21.51.405 (2014); 
Arkansas, ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-79-109 (Supp. 2015); Colorado, COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §10-
16-107 (West Supp. 2015); Delaware, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, §§ 9902–9903 (Supp. 2014); 
Hawaii, HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 431:14G-105 (West Supp. 2016); Indiana. IND. CODE § 27-
8-4-7 (2012); Iowa, IOWA CODE ANN. § 514A.13 (West 2015); Kansas, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-
2215 (Supp. 2015); Kentucky, KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.17-380 (LexisNexis 2011)), 
Maryland, MD. CODE ANN. HEALTH–GEN. § 19-108 (LexisNexis 2015); Massachusetts, MASS 
GEN. LAWS ch. 6D § 2 (West 2016); Michigan, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 550.1607 (West 
Supp. 2016); Minnesota, MINN. STAT. ANN § 62A.02 (West Supp. 2016); Mississippi, MISS. 
CODE ANN. § 83–9–3 (West Supp. 2015); Nebraska, NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-710 
(LexisNexis Supp. 2015); Nevada, NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 686B.070 (LexisNexis 2014); 
New Hampshire, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 415:1 (2015); New Mexico, N.M. STAT. ANN. 
§ 59A-18-13.2 (West Supp. 2015); New York, N.Y. INS. LAW § 213 (McKinney 2015); North 
Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 58-51-95 (West Supp. 2015); North Dakota, N.D. CENT. 
CODE § 26.1-17-26 (2010); Ohio, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3923.021 (LexisNexis 2010); 
Oklahoma, OKL. STAT. ANN. tit. 36 § 2606 (West 2011); Oregon, OR. REV. STAT. § 743.018 
(2015); Tennessee, TENN. CODE ANN. § 56-26-102 (Supp. 2015); Vermont, VT. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 8 § 4062 (2015); and West Virginia, W. VA. CODE ANN. § 16-29B-1 (LexisNexis Supp. 
2016).  
 254. “File-and-use” authority generally means that the insurance companies must file their 
proposed rates with the department of insurance, but the rates may go into effect without de-
partment approval. The department may have the ability to go back and disapprove a rate 
increase that was later deemed unreasonable, usually triggered by a consumer complaint pro-
cess. COMMUNITY CATALYST, supra note 253, at 2. The following states vest the insurance 
commissioner with file-and-use authority: Arizona, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-1342.02 
(2010); Illinois, 235 ILL. COMP. STAT ANN. 93/25 (West 2008); Louisiana, LA. STAT. ANN. 
§ 22:972 (2009); Missouri, MO. ANN. STAT. § 354.152 (West 2015); Montana, MONT. CODE 
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individual, group, HMOs, PPOs) are subject to their rate-review requirements.255 Re-
cent research suggests states with stronger forms of rate review authority, such as 
prior-approval authority and loss-ratio requirements, experienced lower premium in-
creases in the individual market than states without rate review authority or with only 
file-and-use authority.256  
Although insurance rate review focuses on premium rate increases rather than on 
provider prices, limiting the ability of insurance companies to raise premiums puts 
pressure on providers negotiating with the health plans.257 When health plans are 
limited in their ability to raise premiums, they cannot simply pass high provider 
prices on to the policy holders. But most state insurance rate review systems, even 
as augmented by ACA requirements, are generally inadequate to offset some insur-
ers’ lack of bargaining power relative to powerful providers. 
To really get at provider pricing power, insurance rate review must be further 
strengthened by giving the insurance commissioner authority to condition approval 
of insurance rates on mandatory limits on provider price increases. For instance, 
Rhode Island has expanded its insurance department’s authority to limit annual price 
increases for inpatient and outpatient services.258 The state caps the amount of price 
increases to which insurers can contractually agree to the Consumer Price Index-
Urban plus 1%.259 Rhode Island’s cap on the rate increases insurance plans may ac-
cept from providers is a form of indirect provider rate caps via health insurance rate 
review.  
The advantages of strengthening insurance rate review authority are that stronger 
forms of insurance rate review may be effective at constraining premium growth, 
                                                                                                                 
 
ANN. § 33-22-156 (2015); New Jersey, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17B:18-5 (West 2013); South 
Carolina, S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-71-310 (2015); Texas, TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 1507.008 (West 
2009); Utah, UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-22-602 (LexisNexis 2014); and Virginia, VA. CODE 
ANN. § 38.2-316.1 (2015).  
 255. The following states vest prior approval authority in the insurance commissioner only 
for subsets of the insurance market: Connecticut, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-638 (West 
2011); Florida, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.410 (West 2016); Georgia, GA. CODE ANN. § 33-21-13 
(2014); Idaho, IDAHO CODE § 41-5206 (2010); Maine, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 2736 
(2015); Pennsylvania, 35 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 449.17b (West Supp. 2016); 
Rhode Island, 4D R.I. GEN. LAWS § 27-18-54 (2008); South Dakota, S.D. CODIFIED LAWS 
§ 58-17-4.1 (2004); Washington, WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 48.44.020 (West 2014); 
Wisconsin, WIS. STAT. ANN. § 625.11 (West 2006); and Wyoming, WYO. STAT. ANN. § 26-
18-135 (2015). 
 256. Pinar Karaca-Mandic, Brent D. Fulton, Ann Hollingshead & Richard M. Schaffer, 
States with Stronger Health Insurance Rate Review Authority Experienced Lower Premiums 
in the Individual Market, 34 HEALTH AFF. 1358, 1360 (2015).  
 257. See NASI PANEL ON PRICING POWER, supra note 26, at 44. 
 258. 6C R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-14.5-3 (Supp. 2015); CODE R.I. REG. 4424 (2012). 
 259. See R.I. Office of the Health Ins. Comm., Reg. 17, Sec. 7.e (setting affordability stand-
ards that include limits on hospital rate increases as a condition of health insurance rate 
approval), http://www.ohic.ri.gov/documents/Regulation-17-Filing-of-Forms-and-Rates.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/29UW-RUBH]. The rules limit hospital price increases to the CPI-Urban 
less Food and Energy for the Northeast Region (CPI-U) plus 1%, decreasing to CPI-U plus 
0% by 2018. See Cogan, supra note 252, at 463 n.297. 
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which may be especially important as the insurance market becomes more concen-
trated.260 A significant advantage is that insurance rate review builds on a state’s 
existing institutions and infrastructure. In addition, even in states without an APCD, 
the insurance commissioner has extensive authority to gather private price and claims 
data from payers in the state. To be effective, however, most states would have to 
augment the authority of the insurance commissioner, as Rhode Island did, to explic-
itly place limits on provider price increases as part of its insurance rate review 
authority.261 
Without the authority to impose limits on provider prices, a major limitation of 
most states’ insurance rate review system is that the standards for reviewing rate 
increases are not calibrated to address providers’ pricing power but rather get at an-
tiquated property-casualty insurance market problems, such as financial solvency.262 
Another challenge of insurance rate review is the scope of most states’ laws and the 
ACA are too limited and may not apply to all health insurance products by excluding, 
for example, for-profit, employer-based, or large-group plans.263 In addition, it is un-
clear how existing rate review authority will apply to provider-risk-bearing organi-
zations, such as ACOs or conglomerates consisting of health systems with a health 
plan. Another risk is that stronger limits on insurers’ premium revenue without ad-
dressing provider pricing power may drive insurers to fold or exit the market. Finally, 
to the extent insurance rate caps or targets are based on averages, they may widen 
the gap between the “must-have” and “have-not” providers.264 Must-have health sys-
tems may still command monopoly prices, but to get under the cap, the insurers may 
force less powerful providers to lower prices below sustainable levels or exit the 
market.  
In sum, the existing rate review authority in most states will not likely provide 
sufficient levers to oversee and contain the pricing power of integrated providers. 
However, states can follow Rhode Island’s example and build on the existing 
                                                                                                                 
 
 260. Karaca-Mandic et al., supra note 256, at 1365; Healthy Competition? An Examination 
of the Proposed Health Insurance Mergers and the Consequent Impact on Competition: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Regulatory Reform, Commercial and Antitrust Law of the 
H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th Cong. (2015), https://judiciary.house.gov/wp-content 
/uploads/2016/02/114-47_96274.pdf [https://perma.cc/ASS3-W8AW] (written statement of 
Jaime S. King, Professor of Law at the University of California, Hastings College of Law). 
 261. See supra notes 258–59 and accompanying text. 
 262. John Cogan delves extensively into the post-ACA insurance rate review system and 
concludes:  
Since the states, and now the federal government, apply to health insurance a rate 
review standard designed to address a set of market failures that existed a hundred 
years ago for a different insurance product, the health insurance rate review process 
is simply incapable of controlling the fundamental problems that plague today’s 
health insurance market—the market failures leading to excessive provider prices. 
As such, rate review can do little to control the medical cost component of health 
insurance rates. Simply put, there is a mismatch: health insurance rate review uses 
the wrong tools for the job at hand. 
Cogan, supra note 252, at 415 (emphasis in original). 
 263. See id. at 469. 
 264. See NASI PANEL ON PRICING POWER, supra note 26, at 44. 
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infrastructure and expertise of the insurance department to provide insurance 
commissioners regulatory authority over private provider rate increases.  
E. Private Rate Caps 
As an intermediate step before full-fledged rate regulation and in conjunction with 
the establishment of a rate oversight authority, a state could cap providers’ private 
health care prices. The cap would apply to all private payers, including out-of-
network payments and self-pay patients.265 In many proposals, price caps are set as 
a percentage of Medicare rates. For example, health economics and policy experts 
from Dartmouth suggested a private price cap of 125% of Medicare rates;266 Robert 
Murray, former executive director of Maryland’s rate setting agency, suggested a cap 
of 150–175% of Medicare rates.267 Recent analysis demonstrating that private 
inpatient payments are, on average, 175% of Medicare payments may suggest that 
maximum price cap levels may need to be even higher.268 Alternatively, price caps 
could be defined not by reference to Medicare rates but in terms of average or per-
centages of private prices. Such a price cap would require access to private price data 
from an APCD or other database.269 
                                                                                                                 
 
 265. Mark Hall & Carl Schneider, Price-Gouging by Doctors and Hospitals, HEALTH 
REFORM WATCH (July 19, 2009), https://web.archive.org/web/20091211202230/http:// 
www.healthreformwatch.com/2009/07/19/price-gouging-by-doctors-and-hospitals/ [https:// 
perma.cc/N2HR-B6HE] (suggesting a price cap of 150% of Medicare prices for self-pay 
patients).  
 266. Jonathan Skinner, Elliot Fisher & James Weinstein, The 125 Percent Solution: Fixing 
Variations in Health Care Prices, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Aug. 26, 2014), http://healthaffairs.org 
/blog/2014/08/26/the-125-percent-solution-fixing-variations-in-health-care-prices/ [https://perma.cc 
/6ZU5-9433] (“If every patient and every insurance company always had the option of paying 
125 percent of the Medicare price for any service, we would effectively cap the worst of the 
price spikes. No longer would the tourist checked out at the ER for heat stroke be clobbered 
with a sky-high bill. Nor would the uninsured single mother be charged 10 times the best price 
for her child’s asthma care. This is not just another government regulation, but instead a 
protection plan that shields consumers from excessive market power.”). 
 267. See Robert Murray, The Case for a Coordinated System of Provider Payments in the 
United States, 37 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 679, 689 (2012) [hereinafter Murray, The Case 
for a Coordinated System of Provider Payments]; Robert Murray, Health Servs. Cost Review 
Comm’n, The Cost of Hospital Care: Experience from Maryland’s All-Payer Rate Setting 
System, NAT’L HEALTH POL’Y F., at slide 21 (Oct. 8, 2010), http://www.hscrc.state.md.us 
/documents/pdr/Presentations/TheCostofHospitalCareNHPFR_Murray2010-10-08.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/U25A-RRJ2]. 
 268. Thomas M. Selden, Zeynal Karaca, Patricia Keenan, Chapin White & Richard 
Kronick, The Growing Difference Between Public and Private Payment Rates for Inpatient 
Hospital Care, 34 HEALTH AFF. 2147, 2148–49 (2015) (finding that the differential between 
average private rates have grown to 75% higher than Medicare rates in 2012, up from about 
10% higher than Medicare in the period 1996–2001).  
 269. See, e.g., Robin Gelburd, The Need for a Comprehensive, Current, and Market-
Representative Health Care Cost Benchmark, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Oct. 7, 2014), 
http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2014/10/07/the-need-for-a-comprehensive-current-and-market 
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Rate caps offer several advantages. First, they can limit outlier prices at the top 
end of the scale, while still allowing for some competition below the cap.270 Rate 
caps preserve the ability of providers to charge different prices from each other, 
which allows providers to compete within this range on the basis of price or quality, 
but the caps limit the extent of price variation by imposing a ceiling on prices.271 
Second, a broad cap on private payer rates would improve payers’ bargaining posi-
tion to resist price increases by powerful providers or at least put a regulatory back-
stop on the degree to which such providers can charge monopoly prices. Third, rate 
caps are simpler from a regulatory perspective than rate setting, where the adminis-
trative body has to set prices for each service, because rate caps piggyback on the 
prices set in the Medicare system. 272 
On the other hand, to the extent that rate caps piggyback on Medicare rates, they 
incorporate all the flaws of the Medicare pricing system as well as its strengths.273 
Rate caps also do not eliminate inefficiencies and administrative costs of price dis-
crimination by providers, the practice of charging different rates to different payers 
for the same service.274 Rate caps should only be considered for noncompetitive mar-
kets, because any rate-cap level, even if supported by substantial expertise and data, 
will not precisely replicate the maximum prices that would result in a competitive 
market in equilibrium. Some have criticized rate caps and other forms of rate 
regulation as potentially stifling financial incentives for innovation.275 Rate caps are 
                                                                                                                 
 
-representative-health-care-cost-benchmark/ [https://perma.cc/2PR6-AVNB ] (proposing to 
set a provider’s “usual, customary, and reasonable” (UCR) rates, used in fee disputes for out-
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 270. NASI PANEL ON PRICING POWER, supra note 26, at 46. 
 271. Erin C. Fuse Brown, Resurrecting Health Care Rate Regulation, 67 HASTINGS L.J. 85, 
133 (2015).  
 272. Robert A. Berenson, Jonathan H. Sunshine, David Helms & Emily Lawton, Why 
Medicare Advantage Plans Pay Hospitals Traditional Medicare Prices, 34 HEALTH AFF. 1289, 
1295 (2015) (“Placing an upper limit on what a hospital or physician can charge as a 
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especially high-price hospitals.”). 
 273. Gelburd, supra note 269 (critiquing a system of price caps based on Medicare prices 
because Medicare may not be representative of costs or particular dynamics in certain markets, 
such as for lower-volume providers).  
 274. Uwe E. Reinhardt, The Many Different Prices Paid to Providers and the Flawed 
Theory of Cost Shifting: Is It Time for a More Rational All-Payer System?, 30 HEALTH AFF. 
2125, 2128–29 (2011). 
 275. See, e.g., Michael A. Morrisey, Frank A. Sloan & Samuel A. Mitchell, State Rate 
Setting: An Analysis of Some Unresolved Issues, 2 HEALTH AFF. 36, 36 (1983) (noting that 
detractors of state rate setting say that rate setting stifles innovation).  
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politically challenging as well; they are likely to be opposed by the most powerful 
providers whose pricing power will be limited by the caps. Caps may be supported, 
however, by health plans, employers, and other purchasers of health care because 
they could constrain the cost of including must-have providers in health plan 
networks.  
To date, no state has implemented price caps, although Rhode Island’s insurance 
rate caps276 and West Virginia’s now-defunct hospital rate review program277 resem-
ble the price caps described here.278  
Price caps are often viewed as an intermediate, less intrusive alternative to rate-
setting to limit unwarranted price variation especially among dominant providers. 
Nevertheless, some administrative infrastructure must be established to determine 
whether to implement a price cap or how to set the cap. States will require data from 
an APCD and perhaps a rate oversight commission with expertise to come up with 
the price cap levels and methodology.  
F. Provider Rate Regulation 
In highly concentrated provider markets where provider conglomerates are exer-
cising unchecked market power, states can address provider pricing power through 
direct regulation of provider prices. Different versions of rate regulation are dis-
cussed below: all-payer rate setting exemplified by Maryland’s system; private rate 
regulation as illustrated by West Virginia’s now-defunct rate-review authority; and 
the move to incorporate rate setting into global budget initiatives. 
1. All-Payer Rate Setting 
The prototypical system of provider rate regulation is all-payer rate setting, which 
would set the rate for all payers, whether private insurers, government programs, or 
self-pay patients. To include Medicare in the all-payer model, the state must obtain 
a waiver from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services.279 Under an all-payer 
system, either a rate setting commission or a representative body of payers negotiates 
                                                                                                                 
 
 276. See supra text accompanying notes 258–59. 
 277. See supra text accompanying note 290–92. 
 278. In an effort to address persistent provider price variation in Massachusetts, a SEIU-
led ballot initiative in 2015–2016 proposed to limit providers’ private rates to a corridor 20% 
above or 10% below the average price paid to all providers by that health plan for that service. 
Massachusetts Fair Health Care Pricing Act, No. 15-19 (2015–2016 Mass. Ballot Initiatives), 
http://www.mass.gov/ago/docs/government/2015-petitions/15-19.pdf [https://perma.cc/3CZ6-8D3Q]. 
The SEIU agreed to drop the ballot measure when the Massachusetts legislature passed a 
compromise to create a fund to redistribute funds from higher- to lower-priced hospitals and 
with the promise of more union jobs at the largest hospital system. Priyanka Dayal McCluskey 
& Jim O’Sullivan, Deal Reached To Avert Ballot Question on Hospitals, BOS. GLOBE  
|(May 25, 2016), https://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2016/05/25/deal-reached-avert-ballot 
-question-hospitals/xDPLHx13YRUq89Qz8FMCXK/story.html [https://perma.cc/TZ8C-TG7K]. 
 279. See Robert Murray, Setting Hospital Rates To Control Costs and Boost Quality: The 
Maryland Experience, 28 HEALTH AFF. 1395, 1395–96 (2009).  
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a uniform set of provider reimbursement rates.280 Although traditionally applied to 
hospital services, in its broadest form, rate setting could apply to all provider services 
(whether hospital, physician, post-acute, lab, diagnostic, etc.).  
Under the rate setting commission approach, the commission collects detailed in-
formation about costs, patient volumes, hospital finances, and services for each pro-
vider for use in rate setting.281 The best-known and only example of this public utility 
model of rate setting is Maryland’s all-payer rate setting system, where an adminis-
trative body sets hospital rates.282 Maryland’s system has controlled hospital costs-
per-case, but it must be paired with global budgets or ACO-type mechanisms to limit 
incentives to increase patient volume. In the 1970s, several states adopted rate setting 
systems only to abandon them during the deregulatory era of the 1980s–90s when 
managed care seemed to be constraining health care costs.283 
For the second model of rate setting through collective negotiation, there are no 
examples from the United States, but Japan, Germany, France, Switzerland, and 
other OECD countries use this model.284 This model combines the bargaining lever-
age of all payers together in an oligopsony.285 To counteract provider pricing power, 
insurers combine their bargaining power and collectively negotiate with each pro-
vider separately or with a consortium representing all providers.286 For those con-
cerned about concentration among health insurers, allowing payers to come together 
to bargain collectively with providers is not the same as increasing concentration in 
the insurance market. The individual health plans would still have to compete for 
their own customers on the basis of premiums, provider networks, consumer experi-
ence, and other benefits.287  
Although rate setting eliminates price discrimination by a single provider against 
                                                                                                                 
 
 280. See Vladeck & Rice, supra note 13, at 1312–13. 
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(providing for the HSCRC’s authority to review and set hospital rates); MD. CODE ANN., INS. 
§ 15-604 (requiring all payers to reimburse Maryland hospitals based on the rates established 
by the HSCRC); MD. CODE REGS. 10.37.01–.37.12 (2016) (setting forth administrative rules 
for hospital rate review and rate setting in Maryland); see also Murray, The Case for a 
Coordinated System of Provider Payments, supra note 267, at 686.  
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[https://perma.cc/YK3S-DXJV]; Reinhardt, supra note 274, at 2129; Vladeck & Rice, supra 
note 13, at 1313. 
 285. Vladeck & Rice, supra note 13, at 1313.  
 286. See Austin Frakt, All-Payer Rate Setting and Health Reform’s Underpants Gnomes 
Strategy, WASH. POST: WONKBLOG (June 2, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs 
/wonkblog/post/all-payer-rate-setting-and-health-reforms-underpants-gnomes-strategy/2011 
/06/02/AG3SfHHH_blog.html#pagebreak [https://perma.cc/FP6X-2KD3]. 
 287. See id. 
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its various payers, rate setting generally allows providers to charge different prices 
from each other, which preserves some degree of competition. Competition can be 
amplified by reporting providers’ percentage markup above the standard rate and 
quality ratings to allow price and quality comparisons with other providers.288 Some-
what like Medicare, this approach allows for price differences to reflect differences 
in costs if, for example, the facility is a teaching hospital.289 To the extent it encour-
ages price and quality transparency, rate setting could also encourage competition 
among providers on the basis of value, while still limiting the pricing power of dom-
inant providers.  
2. Private Rate Regulation 
Until recently, West Virginia provided a different model of provider rate regula-
tion through review of providers’ private prices.290 West Virginia established its 
Health Care Authority in 1983 to gather information on health care costs and run the 
state’s rate regulation and certificate of need programs to control health care costs 
and capital expenditures.291 In 2016, West Virginia abolished the agency’s hospital 
rate review authority,292 but we describe its system here as an example of a state 
program to regulate private prices.  
Under the prior system, West Virginia hospitals would submit a rate application 
to the Authority with their proposed private rates and their cost information, and the 
Health Care Authority could approve, disapprove, or seek modification of the hospi-
tal’s rates for private payers.293 West Virginia’s hospital rate review system excluded 
Medicare rates (which would require a Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services 
(CMS) waiver) as well Medicaid and public employees’ insurance rates.294 A hospi-
tal could accept a guaranteed or pre-approved rate increase by tying its proposed 
increase to a benchmarking methodology, based on peer hospitals’ costs and charges, 
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or it could apply for a greater rate increase subject to more in-depth review.295 Rather 
than setting rates precisely for each hospital, West Virginia’s system effectively cre-
ated a rate corridor with the authority-approved charge limit serving as the ceiling on 
its privately negotiated prices and the hospital’s costs serving as the floor.296 Under 
this system, hospitals could negotiate different prices and payment methodologies 
with different payers, preserving a degree of price variation and discrimination.  
Under its private rate review system, West Virginia’s costs-per-case grew slower 
than the national average, suggesting that it was somewhat effective at controlling 
health care price growth.297 However, West Virginia’s inpatient and outpatient utili-
zation rates were much higher than the national average, which drove the state’s rela-
tively high per capita hospital spending.298 In any event, without rate review authority 
and with new laws shielding hospital mergers and conduct from state and federal 
antitrust liability,299 West Virginia has moved rapidly to remove oversight of hospital 
pricing or competition.  
3. Global Budgets 
Newer rate setting approaches are moving to incorporate global budgets to simul-
taneously regulate prices and utilization for providers by imposing total revenue lim-
its on health systems.300 States can prospectively set a global budget for an integrated 
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health system to cover the total expected health care costs of a defined population 
for a given time period.301 A health system that exceeds its global budget must make 
up for the excess spending in the following year’s budget, but if its expenditures 
come in under budget, the health system keeps the surplus.  
CMS has modified Maryland’s rate setting waiver to require implementation of 
global budgets.302 Other states could similarly establish regulatory limits on hospital 
budgets without first implementing stand-alone rate setting. Controlling a provider’s 
total revenues simultaneously constrains both prices and utilization because the pro-
vider’s revenues are the result of a combination of its prices, utilization, and operat-
ing costs. A global budget approach tied to population health spending may be more 
efficient than stand-alone hospital rate setting because providers cannot simply in-
crease utilization to make up for constrained prices, increase prices to compensate 
for constrained utilization, or cost shift between inpatient and outpatient settings. 
Vermont passed legislation in 2012 to constrain total health care spending through 
administrative review of hospital budgets.303 Hospitals are required to submit their 
proposed annual budget to the state’s Green Mountain Care Board for review and 
approval.304 The Board may require a hospital to adjust its budget with changes to its 
rates or net revenues,305 and hospital compliance with the budget is enforceable 
through court-ordered injunction or civil administrative penalties.306 Vermont is 
moving toward a global budget system, which would allow the Board to set payments 
rates and total revenues for hospitals from all payers to manage all of the health care 
for a given population.307 Under the global budget system, the Board would set a 
uniform rate increase for each hospital applicable to all payers, eliminating the 
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hospital’s separate rate negotiation with each commercial payer.308 In late 2016, 
CMS and Vermont agreed to implement an all-payer model, which aligns payment 
rates for Medicare, Medicaid, and commercial payers under an all-payer accountable 
care organization.309 Under the all-payer model, which not only applies to hospital 
services but also includes physician and other ancillary providers, Vermont will limit 
statewide per-capita health spending growth to 3.5% annually and move away from 
a fee-for-service payment model to payments that are adjusted for population health 
outcomes and quality of care targets.310 
Initial results from Maryland and Vermont’s efforts at hospital budget oversight 
are promising. During the first year with global budgets, Maryland limited per capita 
hospital cost growth to 1.47%—well under the target of 3.58% annual growth—and 
saved Medicare $116 million.311 Vermont’s hospitals have been limited to modest 
budget increases, but they simultaneously increased their profitability.312 Global 
budget models are promising because they go beyond rate setting models that focus 
only on prices to incorporate mechanisms to oversee all the components of total 
health care spending: prices, utilization, and hospital operating costs. 
The primary advantage of all forms of provider rate regulation is that these ap-
proaches directly counteract providers’ pricing power in noncompetitive markets. 
Rate regulation does this either through administrative rate setting as is done by 
                                                                                                                 
 
 308. Richard Slusky, Spenser Weppler & Robert Murray, Green Mountain Care Bd., 
Proposed Pilot Payment Reform Projects: Consideration of Hospital Global Budget Pilot, VT. 
GEN. ASSEMBLY, at slide 8 (Apr. 3, 2014), http://legislature.vermont.gov/assets/Documents 
/2014/WorkGroups/House%20Ways%20and%20Means/Health%20Care/W~Robert%20Murray 
%20and%20Richard%20Slusky~Proposed%20Pilot%20Payment%20Reform%20Projects 
%20Consideration%20of%20Hospital%20Global%20Budget%20Pilot~4-3-2014.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/F45Q-5QVE]. 
 309. Vermont All-Payer Accountable Care Organization Model Agreement, CMS–Vt., 
Oct. 27, 2016, http://gmcboard.vermont.gov/sites/gmcb/files/documents/10-27-16-vermont 
-all-payer-accountable-care-organization-model-agreement.pdf [https://perma.cc/D6MR-JRHV]; 
see also, Green Mountain Care Board of Vermont, In re: Vermont All-Payer Accountable Care 
Organization Model Agreement (Oct. 31, 2016), http://gmcboard.vermont.gov/sites/gmcb 
/files/documents/APM-FINAL-Justification.pdf [https://perma.cc/WZH9-5F3Z] (describing 
the Board’s justification for entering into the all-payer-model agreement with CMS). 
 310. See Vermont All-Payer ACO Model, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS. (Oct. 
26, 2016), https://innovation.cms.gov/initiatives/vermont-all-payer-aco-model/ [https://perma.cc 
/3MDQ-XFQE]. 
 311. Ankit Patel, Rahul Rajkumar, John M. Colmers, Donna Kinzer, Patrick H. Conway & 
Joshua M. Sharfstein, Maryland’s Global Hospital Budgets—Preliminary Results from an All-
Payer Model, 373 N. ENG. J. MED. 1899, 1899 (2015).  
 312. See Nancy Remsen, Hospitals in Vermont Anticipate Modest Budget Increases Next 
Year, SEVEN DAYS (July 23, 2015), http://www.sevendaysvt.com/OffMessage/archives/2015 
/07/23/hospitals-in-vermont-anticipate-modest-budget-increases-next-year [https://perma.cc 
/5RBM-CYR6] (reporting that the Chair of the Green Mountain Care Board, Al Gobeille, 
noted that the average rate increase Vermont hospitals requested from insurers was only 4.3%, 
the lowest rate increase in fifteen years); see also Erin Mansfield, Special Report: Despite 
Regulation, Hospital Profits Up, VT DIGGER (July 17, 2016) http://vtdigger.org/2016/07/17 
/special-report-despite-regulation-hospital-profits-up/ [https://perma.cc/9A76-JUJH].  
110 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL  [Vol. 92:55 
 
public utilities and in the Medicare program or by combining the bargaining power 
of all purchasers and payers. Rate regulation also has the potential to dramatically 
reduce administrative costs for providers. By eliminating price discrimination among 
payers, providers could reduce the administrative costs of negotiating different rates 
and maintaining separate billing procedures for each payer. These administrative 
costs are significant drivers of health care costs as the United States’ fragmented 
payer landscape explains much of why providers’ administrative costs are so much 
higher in the United States than in other countries with similarly developed health 
systems.313 To maximize transparency and administrative ease, the rate schedule 
could be based on Medicare rates, and to the extent that Medicare is not included in 
the payment system, the rate setting entity could express private rates as a simple 
multiplier of Medicare rate. 
Rate setting could allow prices to vary between providers, but the variation in 
price would reflect differences in quality rather than market power as it does now.314 
Thus, under a rate-setting regime, you could still have an element of competition 
between providers on the basis of value and quality or services offered.  
One of the biggest challenges of rate setting is political. The major hospital sys-
tems whose prices would be constrained the most are often extremely powerful enti-
ties, the engines of local economies and jobs. A lesson from the many states that 
implemented and later abandoned rate setting in the 1980s is that the rate-setting 
agency must be structured to avoid regulatory failure from bureaucratic complexity 
and regulatory capture.315 Regulatory complexity and inflexibility can be avoided by 
using standard payment formulas rather than individual budget review.316 A global 
budget approach may also get regulators out of the difficult business of setting spe-
cific rates for each item and service and instead let them focus on total hospital budg-
ets, which may be more flexible and less complex. Ensuring the independence of the 
rate setting authority from excessive industry or political influence is essential to 
avoiding regulatory capture. Agency independence can be protected by prohibiting 
commissioners from having affiliations with regulated providers317 and 
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implementing accountability measures, such as federal oversight under a Medicare 
waiver, to counteract local political pressure to loosen standards or make special 
exceptions.318 
 Another significant challenge with rate setting is that it only addresses the price 
half of the cost-control equation.319 Rate regulation must be paired with global 
budgets, volume adjustments, or other population-based payments to control the ten-
dency to increase utilization. Both Maryland and West Virginia demonstrated that 
rate setting can control costs-per-case quite effectively, but not volume. Maryland’s 
2014 Medicare waiver adds global budgets to its rate-setting program, which is no 
easy feat, but it is a necessary adjustment to control both the price and utilization 
components of health care spending. Vermont’s all-payer model builds on an ACO 
design, in which the ACO will receive a population-based payment for every person 
attributed to it, whether a Medicare beneficiary or privately insured patient.320 
In sum, in states where competition is no longer functioning to keep provider 
prices in check, rate regulation may be the preferred strategy, or the last best hope 
for counteracting the price effects of health care integration. To set rates or global 
budgets, provider rate regulation must be built on a foundation of information from 
an APCD or similarly comprehensive and detailed claim data. The ingredient of in-
dependence is necessary to avoid regulatory failure from capture by powerful 
providers.  
CONCLUSION 
Bending the health care cost curve requires constraining both utilization and price. 
Reducing fragmentation in health care can help reduce overutilization by offering 
incentives to promote collaboration and integration. But increased health care inte-
gration is a double-edged sword. Efforts to integrate health care to achieve benefits 
in terms of quality and reduced utilization can also lead to increased market power 
and prices, which could potentially defeat much or all of the cost savings from re-
duced utilization. 
There are currently few systemic checks on the growing pricing power of inte-
grated health care providers. Federal antitrust and cost-control policies are limited in 
their abilities to control private health care price increases, particularly new forms of 
vertical integration driven by health reforms like ACOs. This creates both an oppor-
tunity and an obligation for states to address rising prices stemming from health care 
integration and consolidation.  
The way to manage the double-edged sword of health care integration is to en-
courage beneficial integration but pair it with oversight on price and quality. States 
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have a menu of policy options, and the particular policy recipe will vary by state, but 
three ingredients are necessary for effective oversight: (1) Information—states must 
have a means to collect and analyze price, quality, utilization, and market data, such 
as an all-payer claims database, in order to determine which policy choices to select 
and to evaluate their success; (2) Independence—state oversight bodies must be in-
sulated from the powerful providers they oversee; and (3) Regulatory Authority 
—state oversight bodies must have the authority to enforce or impose limits on 
providers’ prices when they become too high. If we are to control our personal and 
national health care spending, states have a critical role to play in overseeing health 
care integration and private health care price increases. 
